| Preface | p. ix |
| The Curious Relationship | p. 1 |
| The Alliance Crisis Syndrome | p. 2 |
| Exaggerated Claims | p. 3 |
| Unexamined Premises | p. 7 |
| Superficial Comparisons | p. 9 |
| A Crisis in the Alliance: Concept Clarification | p. 14 |
| A Crisis in the Alliance: Concept Development | p. 18 |
| Getting Out of a Blind Alley | p. 20 |
| Rivalry and Community in Interstate Alliances Prior to the Second World War | p. 25 |
| Alliances in Eighteenth-Century Europe | p. 27 |
| The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars | p. 39 |
| European Alliances, 1822-1854 | p. 52 |
| Alliances during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century | p. 57 |
| The First World War | p. 71 |
| Alliances during the Interwar Period | p. 82 |
| Creating a Contentious Alliance | p. 87 |
| American Views on the Need for an Alliance | p. 90 |
| Military Arrangements | p. 99 |
| The Impact of the Korean War | p. 106 |
| Putting the "Collective" in Collective Defense | p. 113 |
| A Contentious Alliance | p. 116 |
| Why NATO Is Different | p. 120 |
| The Transformation of Alliance Relationships | p. 120 |
| Why NATO Is Different (I): The Political Consequences of Military Integration | p. 127 |
| Why NATO Is Different (II): The Choices Allies Face | p. 130 |
| Why NATO Is Different (III): Interests and Outcomes | p. 134 |
| Why These Differences Matter | p. 139 |
| NATO and the Military Balance | p. 140 |
| NATO during the 1950s: The Crisis over Soviet Ballistic Missiles | p. 142 |
| Background | p. 142 |
| Why the Missiles Issue was Thought to be a NATO Crisis | p. 148 |
| What Actually Happened? | p. 149 |
| The Strategic Balance and Extended Deterrence | p. 150 |
| The Conventional Imbalance | p. 157 |
| The Suicide/Surrender Dilemma | p. 163 |
| Conclusion | p. 173 |
| The INF Crisis | p. 175 |
| Background | p. 175 |
| Why the INF Case was Thought to be a NATO Crisis | p. 182 |
| What Actually Happened? | p. 185 |
| NATO Missiles and European Attitudes | p. 186 |
| Did Any NATO Member Cross the Crisis Threshold? | p. 190 |
| Resisting Soviet Coercion | p. 197 |
| Conclusion | p. 199 |
| NATO and the Out-of-Area Issue | p. 202 |
| The 1956 Suez Crisis | p. 203 |
| Background | p. 203 |
| Why Suez was Thought to be a NATO Crisis | p. 205 |
| What Actually Happened? | p. 207 |
| Conclusion | p. 218 |
| The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan | p. 222 |
| Background | p. 222 |
| Why the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan was Thought to be a NATO Crisis | p. 226 |
| What Actually Happened? | p. 230 |
| The Afghanistan Case in Retrospect | p. 239 |
| Conclusion | p. 240 |
| Nonmilitary Issues | p. 242 |
| The Soviet Pipeline Crisis | p. 243 |
| Background | p. 243 |
| Why the Pipeline Issue was Thought to be NATO's Worst Crisis Ever | p. 253 |
| What Actually Happened? | p. 257 |
| Conclusion | p. 272 |
| The Bosnian Civil War | p. 273 |
| Background | p. 273 |
| Why Bosnia was Thought to be NATO's Worst Crisis Ever | p. 276 |
| What Actually Happened? | p. 279 |
| Conclusion | p. 284 |
| Why NATO Endures | p. 287 |
| Why NATO Is Different | p. 287 |
| Why NATO Endures | p. 294 |
| The Iraq Crisis Revisited | p. 302 |
| A Final Word | p. 306 |
| Index | p. 309 |
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