The Peri ide‹¨«n (On Ideas) is the only work in which Aristotle systematically sets out and criticizes arguments for the existence of Platonic forms. Gail Fine presents the first full-length treatment in English of this important but neglected work. She asks how, and how well, Aristotle understands Plato's theory of forms, and why and with what justification he favors an alternative metaphysical scheme. She examines the significance of the Peri ide‹¨«n for some central questions about Plato's theory of forms--whether, for example, there are forms corresponding to every property or only to some, and if only to some, then to which ones; whether forms are universals, particulars or both; and whether they are meanings, properties or both. Fine also provides a general discussion of Plato's theory of forms, and of our evidence about the Peri ide‹¨«n and its date, scope, and aims. While she pays careful attention to the details of the text, she also relates it to contemporary philosophical concerns. The book will be valuable for anyone interested in metaphysics ancient or modern.
Industry Reviews
`supplies the most thorough and acute discussion ever published of all the Platonic arguments examined in Aristotle's treatise...hers will be the authority to which any English-speaking reader wishing to get to grips with On Ideas will turn, for many years to come'
The Times Literary Supplement
'it is the first full length philosophical monograph on the subject in English ... It is notable and practically unique in taking seriously both the theory of forms and Aristotle's criticism of that theory ... an excellent contribution to the subject. It deserves the most careful attention of anyone interested in Plato's metaphysics. It is also a splendid example of how analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy can be mutually enriching.'
Lloyd P Gerson, Bryn Mawr Classical Review 4.5 (1993)
'this is a fine piece of scholarship, and one which will stimulate a good deal of thought on metaphysics, modern as well as ancient ... this is a really splendid book, and students of Plato have every reason to be grateful for Gail Fine's work'
Richard Wallace, Greece & Rome
'in the last fifteen years no one has done more to improve our understanding of it than Gail Fine ... the first book-length treatment of Aristotle's On Ideas to appear in English, and one which is unparalleled in both the detail and the calibre of its logical analysis. Her work gains temendously from being published in this format: she is able to examine complex issues in greater depth and pursue systematic interconnections without redundancy ...
more remains to be said about Aristotle's On Ideas. And Gail Fine has given stimulus to this discussion of the most valuable kind: a detailed, systematic, and controversial view. The quality of her argumentws
ensures that this book will pose a challenge to interpretations for many years to come.'
Victor Caston, Brown University, Mind, Vol. 104, No. 413, January 1995
`For two decades and in several articles, Fine has probed the Platonic dialogues and the works of Aristotle in order to understand and clarify the arguments of this short Aristotelian essay. In this important book, she presents her results ... There is every reason to think that Fine's book will be the standard work on the Peri Ideon for years to come ... Fine's book has a very precise focus and methodology ... her method
is a meticulous, analytical examination of arguments.'
Review of Metaphysics
`Admirable book ... Fine explores the arguments for forms and Aristotle's criticism of them with exemplary thoroughness and care, and great philosophical sophistication ... Her On Ideas is ... not only a first-rate contribution to the understanding of Aristotle's On Ideas, but a work of fundamental importance for our interpretation of Plato's metaphysics and epistemology ... extremely
rich book ... Fine's book raises deep issues about Plato's metaphysics and epistemology. It is an impressive work that richly repays careful study; and no one who is interested in this aspect of ancient thought can afford to ignore it.'
Richard Kraut, The Philosophical Review
