A major new reading of the 1973 war in the Middle East
In this book, first published in Hebrew in 1975 and now available in English for the first time, Amnon Kapeliouk traces the policies and attitudes that led to the 1973 Arab–Israeli war. He describes the multiple diplomatic overtures from Egyptian presidents Nasser and Sadat after 1967 that Israel ignored or contemptuously rejected, as well as the complacent attitude that had become fully entrenched in the Israeli military establishment.
On the political level, the triumvirate of Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and Israel Galili feature prominently as a study in arrogance and incompetence. Kapeliouk also notes the protest movement that arose among active-duty soldiers as well as veterans in the wake of the war demanding political accountability for the failures of the war.
About the Author
Amnon Kapeliouk was a scholar and journalist who reported on Arab affairs for the Israeli press and was a regular contributor to Le Monde and Le Monde diplomatique.
