| Preface | p. xi |
| Acknowledgments | p. xv |
| Staring into the Darwinian Abyss | p. 3 |
| Why Jerry Falwell Is Right | p. 4 |
| The Replicators and the Vehicles | p. 8 |
| What Kind of Robot Is a Person? | p. 12 |
| Whose Goals Are Served by Our Behavior? | p. 13 |
| All Vehicles Overboard! | p. 16 |
| Your Genes Care More about You than You Should Care about Them! | p. 20 |
| Escaping the Clutches of the Genes | p. 23 |
| The Pivotal Insight: Putting People First | p. 26 |
| A Brain at War with Itself | p. 31 |
| Two Minds in One Brain | p. 34 |
| The Autonomous Set of Systems (TASS): The Parts of Your Brain that Ignore You | p. 37 |
| Characterizing the Analytic System: Avoiding the Homunculus Problem | p. 44 |
| One Step at a Time: Figuring Out the Way the World Is with Language | p. 47 |
| Hypothetical Thinking and Representational Complexity | p. 50 |
| Processing without Awareness: There Are Martians in Your Brain! | p. 52 |
| When the Different Kinds of Minds Conflict: The Override Function of the Analytic System | p. 61 |
| The Brain on a Long Leash and the Brain on a Short Leash | p. 63 |
| Try It Yourself-Can You Override TASS in the Famous Four-Card Selection Task and the Famous Linda Task? | p. 69 |
| Don't Be Sphexish | p. 73 |
| Putting the Vehicle First by Getting the Analytic System in the Driver's Seat | p. 78 |
| The Robot's Secret Weapon | p. 81 |
| Choosing Humans over Genes: How Instrumental Rationality and Evolutionary Adaptation Separate | p. 81 |
| What It Means to Be Rational: Putting the Person (the Vehicle) First | p. 85 |
| Fleshing Out Instrumental Rationality | p. 86 |
| Evaluating Rationality: Are We Getting What We Want? | p. 91 |
| The Biases of the Autonomous Brain: Characteristics of the Short-Leash Mind that Sometimes Cause Us Grief | p. 95 |
| The Dangers of Positive Thinking: TASS Can't "Think of the Opposite" | p. 98 |
| Now You Choose It-Now You Don't: Framing Effects Undermine the Notion of Human Rationality | p. 102 |
| Can Evolutionary Psychology Rescue the Ideal of Human Rationality? | p. 108 |
| The Fundamental Computational Biases of the Autonomous Brain | p. 110 |
| The Evolutionary Adaptiveness of the Fundamental Computational Biases | p. 113 |
| Evolutionary Reinterpretations of Responses on Heuristics and Biases Tasks | p. 115 |
| The Fundamental Computational Biases and the Demands for Decontextualization in Modern Society | p. 121 |
| The TASS Traps of the Modern World | p. 125 |
| How Evolutionary Psychology Goes Wrong | p. 131 |
| Modern Society as a Sodium Vapor Lamp | p. 134 |
| Throwing Out the Vehicle with the Bathwater | p. 139 |
| What Follows from the Fact that Mother Nature Isn't Nice | p. 142 |
| Dysrationalia: Why So Many Smart People Do So Many Dumb Things | p. 149 |
| Cognitive Capacities, Thinking Dispositions, and Levels of Analysis | p. 150 |
| TASS Override and Levels of Processing | p. 153 |
| The Great Rationality Debate: The Panglossian, Apologist, and Meliorist Positions Contrasted | p. 154 |
| Dysrationalia: Dissolving the "Smart But Acting Dumb" Paradox | p. 162 |
| Would You Rather Get What You Want Slowly or Get What You Don't Want Much Faster? | p. 164 |
| Jack and His Jewish Problem | p. 167 |
| The Panglossian's Lament: "If Human Cognition Is So Flawed, How Come We Got to the Moon?" | p. 169 |
| From the Clutches of the Genes into the Clutches of the Memes | p. 173 |
| Attack of the Memes: The Second Replicator | p. 174 |
| Rationality, Science, and Meme Evaluation | p. 179 |
| Reflectively Acquired Memes: The Neurathian Project of Meme Evaluation | p. 180 |
| Personal Autonomy and Reflectively Acquired Memes | p. 181 |
| Which Memes Are Good for Us? | p. 184 |
| Why Memes Can Be Especially Nasty (Nastier than Genes Even!) | p. 192 |
| The Ultimate Meme Trick: Why Your Memes Want You to Hate the Idea of Memes | p. 194 |
| Memetic Concepts as Tools of Self-Examination | p. 197 |
| Building Memeplex Self on a Level Playing Field: Memetics as an Epistemic Equalizer | p. 199 |
| Evolutionary Psychology Rejects the Notion of Free-Floating Memes | p. 201 |
| The Co-Adapted Meme Paradox | p. 202 |
| A Soul without Mystery: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin | p. 207 |
| Macromolecules and Mystery Juice: Looking for Meaning in All the Wrong Places | p. 210 |
| Is Human Rationality Just an Extension of Chimpanzee Rationality? Context and Values in Human Judgment | p. 213 |
| There's More to Life than Money-But There's More than Happiness Too: The Experience Machine | p. 217 |
| Nozick on Symbolic Utility | p. 218 |
| "It's Meaning Issue, Not a Money Issue": Expressive Rationality, Ethical Preferences, and Commitment | p. 221 |
| Rising Above the Humean Nexus: Evaluating Our Desires | p. 224 |
| Second-Order Desires and Preferences | p. 225 |
| Achieving Rational Integration of Desires: Forming and Reflecting on Higher-Order Preferences | p. 228 |
| Why Rats, Pigeons, and Chimps Are More Rational than Humans | p. 243 |
| Escaping the Rationality of Constraint | p. 247 |
| Two-Tiered Rationality Evaluation: A Legacy of Human Cognitive Architecture | p. 249 |
| The Spookiness of Subpersonal Entities | p. 251 |
| Desires Connected to Dollars: Another Case of Spooky Subpersonal Optimization | p. 254 |
| The Need for Meta-Rationality | p. 265 |
| The Formula for Personal Autonomy in the Face of Many Subpersonal Threats | p. 268 |
| Are We up to the Task? Finding What to Value in Our Mental Lives | p. 269 |
| Notes | p. 277 |
| References | p. 305 |
| Author Index | p. 345 |
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