The Objects of Thought

`The Objects of Thought is a rich book, full of ideas and arguments. Making room for non-existent objects is a complicated business, and Crane covers a lot of ground very clearly. So this is a great book for anyone who wishes to get a sophisticated overview of the debate about non-existent objects. Because I have only been able to discuss a very small part of this complicated issue, my suggestion is to go out and read the book.' Analysis `Ambitious, ingenious, and lucid . . . Crane's excellent book . . . has all sorts of interesting and insightful things to say about metaphysics, language, and intentionality. There is a great deal to be learned about these things from The Objects of Thought, whether or not one ultimately agrees with the details of Crane's positive view. Crane also has a fluid clear style that makes his book a pleasure to read. So I recommend it very warmly, not merely to those interested in the nonexistent, but to all those interested in metaphysics and intentionality.' Anthony Everett, Mind `His discussion throughout is both delightfully clear and eminently sensible--a quality that is rarer than it should be in view of much recent metaphysical extravagance in analytic philosophy . . . Tim's Crane's account is, all told, of considerable merit, and can be recommended to anyone concerned with the nature of the mind.' Peter Simons, The Times Literary Supplement `ingenious, full of insight and wonderfully clearly written.' Niall Connolly, The Philosophical Quarterly `elegant and original.' Pierre Jacob, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews `Crane offers a solid contribution to the debate on the problem of intentional inexistence . . . Highly recommended.' CHOICE `a rich book, full of ideas and arguments . . . Crane covers a lot of ground very clearly. So this is a great book for anyone who wishes to get a sophisticated overview of the debate about non-existent objects. ' Michelle Montague, Analysis `I recommend it highly to those interested not only in the specific matters with which it deals, but also to philosophers of mind more generally.' Guy Longworth, Philosophy