Quantifier Variance and Realism

The essays in this volume present a distinctive metaontological perspective that combines two ideas: first, that objects in the world exist for the most part in complete independence of language or thought; but, second, that the world can in principle be correctly and adequately described without employing our ordinary concept of "the objects that exist in the world" Although these ideas are often thought to be in conflict, Hirsch argues that they are seen to be perfectly compatible when one has a clear understanding of what is and what is not implied by the possibility of varying the meanings of our quantifier expressions

In the resulting metaontological perspective the mind-dependence of objects is not implied. What is implied, however, is that many ontological disputes are merely verbal, each ontological position employing a different concept of "the objects that exist in the world." Hirsch argues further that this perspective on ontology constitutes a defense of common sense, since the principle of interpretive charity compels us to interpret common sense assertions about the existence and identity of objects as being correct. A further implication is that statements about existence and identity can be vague

The articles in this volume encompass discussions of major metaontological positions found in such writers as Sider, Putnam, Carnap, Lewis and others. There are also discussions of the views of psychologists, such as Kohler and Spelke, as to the development of our concept of an object.