Contents
Permissions
Introduction
How to use this book
How to do philosophy
Following the syllabus
Additional features
Using the anthology
Glossary
Companion website and further resources
Acknowledgements
1 How to do philosophy
Philosophical argument
Deductive argument
Inductive argument
Hypothetical reasoning
Understanding arguments and argument maps
Evaluating arguments
Evaluating claims
An aside: why reason?
Fallacies
Reading philosophy
Approaching the text
Engaging with the text
Beyond the text
Writing philosophy
What you need to know
Planning an essay
Writing an essay
A standard essay structure
General advice
2 Epistemology
I. What is knowledge?
A. Knowledge and its definition
Types of knowledge
Propositional knowledge
The definition of knowledge
The purpose and nature of definition
Can propositional knowledge be defined?
Key points: knowledge and its definition
B. The tripartite view
The tripartite definition of knowledge
Why justified true belief?
Thinking harder: A note on certainty
Are the conditions individually necessary?
Justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge
Truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge
Belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge
Gettierâs objection: are the conditions jointly sufficient?
Key points: the tripartite view
C. Responses
Add a âno false lemmasâ condition (J+T+B+N)
Infallibilism
Thinking harder: rejecting the argument for infallibilism
Reliabilism (R+T+B)
Truth and the third condition
Virtue epistemology (V+T+B)
Zagzebskiâs analysis of knowledge
Key points: Responses
Summary: What is knowledge?
II. Perception as a source of knowledge
A. Direct realism
The argument from perceptual variation
Responses
The argument from illusion
Thinking harder: the argument from hallucination
The disjunctive theory of perception
The time-lag argument
Thinking harder: direct realism and openness
Key points: direct realism
B. Indirect realism
What are sense-data?
Why indirect realism?
Lockeâs distinction between primary and secondary qualities
Scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects
The existence of the external world is the best hypothesis
Two supporting arguments
Thinking harder: the existence of mind-independent objects is not a hypothesis
Representation, resemblance and the nature of physical objects
Berkeleyâs argument that mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects
Key points: indirect realism
C. Berkeleyâs idealism
Berkeley on primary and secondary qualities
Berkeley on secondary qualities
Berkeleyâs attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction
The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects
Three arguments against mind-independent objects
Berkeleyâs âmasterâ argument
Idealism and God
Thinking harder: idealism and the cause of our perceptions
Issues with Berkeleyâs idealism
Problems with the role played by God in Berkeleyâs idealism
Arguments from illusion and hallucination
Idealism leads to solipsism
Key points: Berkeleyâs idealism
Summary: perception as a source of knowledge
III. Reason as a source of knowledge
Rationalism, empiricism and innatism
A priori/a posteriori knowledge
Analytic/synthetic propositions
Necessary/contingent truth
Defining rationalism, empiricism and innatism
Key points: rationalism, empiricism and innatism
A. Innatism
Two arguments for innate knowledge
Platoâs slave boy argument
Leibniz on knowledge of necessary truths
Lockeâs arguments against innate knowledge
Leibnizâs response to Locke
Thinking harder: experience triggers innate knowledge
Alternative empiricist accounts
Lockeâs argument against innate concepts
Rejecting Lockeâs definition of âinnate conceptâ
Leibnizâs defence of innate concepts
The mind as a âtabula rasaâ
Lockeâs two sources of concepts
Hume on impressions and ideas
Simple and complex concepts
Issues with the empiricist theory of concepts
Thinking harder: challenging the copy principle
Leibniz on âintellectual ideasâ
Thinking harder: the concept of substance
Discussion
Key points: innatism
B. The intuition and deduction thesis
Rationalism and empiricism revisited
The meaning of âintuitionâ and âdeductionâ
Empiricist alternatives
Humeâs fork
Descartesâ theory of rational intuition
The cogito
Clear and distinct ideas
Empiricist responses to the cogito
Clear and distinct ideas and God
Descartesâ Trademark argument
Thinking harder: degrees of reality
Empiricist responses to the Trademark argument
Descartesâ cosmological argument
Empiricist responses to Descartesâ cosmological argument
Descartesâ ontological argument
Empiricist responses to Descartesâ ontological argument
Descartesâ proof of the external world
The concept of a physical object
Thinking harder: The existence of physical objects
Empiricist responses to Descartesâ proof of the external world
Key points: the intuition and deduction thesis
Summary: reason as a source of knowledge
IV. The limits of knowledge
A. Philosophical scepticism
The particular nature of philosophical scepticism
Am I a brain in a vat?
The distinction between philosophical scepticism and normal incredulity
Local and global scepticism
Descartesâ sceptical arguments
Key points: philosophical scepticism
B. Responses to scepticism
Descartesâ own response
Empiricist responses
Thinking harder: Direct realism
Thinking harder: Reliabilism
Key points: responses to scepticism
Summary: the limits of knowledge
3 Moral Philosophy
I. Normative ethical theories
A. Utilitarianism
Benthamâs quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism
âThe Principle of Utilityâ
âMeasuring Pleasure and Painâ
Mill on utilitarianism
Millâs qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism
Is pleasure the only good?
Smart on hedonistic and non-hedonistic utilitarianism
Nozickâs experience machine
Preference utilitarianism
Millâs âproofâ of utilitarianism
Stage 1: Happiness is good
Stage 2: Only happiness is good
Issues for (act) utilitarianism
Problems with calculation
Fairness, individual liberty and rights
Partiality
Moral integrity and the individualâs intentions
Rule utilitarianism
Smart on rule utilitarianism
Rule utilitarianism developed
Objections
Key points: utilitarianism
B. Kantian deontological ethics
Deontology
Kantâs account of the good will and duty
The good will
The distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting out of duty
Thinking harder: The good will again
The categorical imperative
Hypothetical and categorical imperatives
Thinking harder: Contradiction in conception and contradiction in will
The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative
Issues for Kantian deontological ethics
Universalisability and morality
Conflicts between duties
The view that consequences of actions determine their moral value
Morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives
The value of certain motives
Key points: Kantian deontological ethics
C. Aristotelian virtue ethics
The good for human beings
Eudaimonia
Final ends
The function argument
Testing the analysis
Thinking harder: the rational âsoulâ
Aristotleâs account of virtues
Virtues as character traits
Virtues, the doctrine of the mean and the importance of feelings
The role of education in the development of a moral character
Practical wisdom
The role of practical wisdom
The relation between practical wisdom, virtue and action
Key points: Aristotelian virtue ethics (I)
Eudaimonia, pleasure and philosophy
Eudaimonia and pleasure
Eudaimonia and philosophy
Voluntary action, choice and moral responsibility
Voluntary and involuntary actions
Choice and deliberation
Thinking harder: moral responsibility
Justice
Issues for Aristotelian virtue ethics
Guidance on how to act
Conflicts between virtues
The possibility of circularity involved in defining virtuous acts and
virtuous people in terms of each other
Thinking harder: Virtue and eudaimonia
Key points: Aristotelian virtue ethics (II)
Summary: normative ethical theories
II. Applied ethics
Stealing
Utilitarianism
Kantian deontology
Aristotelian virtue ethics
Eating animals
Utilitarianism
Kantian deontology
Aristotle, Diamond and virtue ethics
Simulated killing
Playing the killer
An audienceâs perspective
Telling lies
Utilitarianism
Kantian deontology
Aristotelian virtue ethics
Key points: applied ethics
Summary: applied ethics
III. Metaethics
What is metaethics?
The origins of moral principles: reason, emotion/attitudes, or society
The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism
Key points: The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism
A. Moral realism
From cognitivism to moral realism
Moral naturalism
Utilitarianism as naturalism
Thinking harder: naturalism in virtue ethics
Moral non-naturalism: Mooreâs intuitionism
The naturalistic fallacy
The open question argument
Thinking harder: is the ânaturalistic fallacyâ a real fallacy?
Intuitionism
Objections
Issues for moral realism
A J Ayerâs verification principle
The argument from Humeâs fork
Humeâs argument from motivation
Humeâs is-ought gap
Mackieâs argument from relativity
Mackieâs arguments from queerness
Key points: moral realism
B. Moral anti-realism
Error theory
Non-cognitivism and moral anti-realism
Emotivism
Emotivism and subjectivism
Ayerâs defence
Emotivism after Ayer
Prescriptivism
Prescriptive meaning
Good
Moral language
Issues for moral anti-realism
Can moral anti-realism account for how we use moral language?
Thinking harder: disagreement and moral argument
Whether moral anti-realism becomes moral nihilism
Moral progress
Key points: moral anti-realism
Metaethics and applied ethics
Summary: metaethics
4 Preparing for the exam
The examination
The structure of the exam
Assessment objectives
Understanding the question: giving the examiners what they are looking for
Short-answer questions
Nine-mark questions
Fifteen-mark questions
Revision: itâs more than memory
Exam technique: getting the best result you can
Revision tips
Exam tips
Glossary (with Joanne Lovesey)
Index by syllabus content
Subject index
