Perception and Basic Beliefs

Abbreviations Chapter 1: External Object Foundationalism 1.1: The Problem of the External World 1.2: Metaphysical and Epistemological Direct Realisms 1.3: Basic Beliefs Chapter 2: Doxastic and Nondoxastic Theories 2.1: Evidential and Nonevidential Justifiers 2.2: The Supervenience Argument 2.3: Doxasticism and Nondoxasticism 2.4: Doxastic Theories Chapter 3: Experientialist Theories 3.1: Sensation and Perception 3.2: Sensations as Grounds 3.2.1: Sensationless Perception 3.2.2: The Sensation/perception Gap and Collateral Information 3.2.3: Problems Concerning Basing 3.2.4: SE and the Content of Sensations 3.3: Percepts as Grounds 3.3.1: In Search of the Percept 3.3.2: Percepts and Beliefs 3.3.3: The Zombies Return 3.4: The Belief Principle 3.5: Experiential States as Nonevidential Justifiers 3.6: Intuitive Resistance 3.7: Recapitulation Chapter 4: Perceptual Systems and Perceptual Beliefs 4.1: Perceptual Systems 4.1.1: Cognitive Systems/Modules 4.1.2: Perceptual Modules 4.2: The Plausibility of the Perceptual System Theory 4.2.1: The "Grain Size" of Perceptual Beliefs 4.2.2: Perception and Ungrounded Justified Belief 4.2.3: Perceptual Learning and Nonexperiential "Looks" 4.2.4: Percept Experientialism Revisited 4.3: Perceptual Beliefs and Basic Beliefs Chapter 5: Perception, Clairvoyance, and Reliability 5.1: Simple Reliabilism and the Norman/Truetemp Objections; 5.2: Clairvoyance and Basicality 5.2.1: Underspecification and the "Clairvoyance Challenge" 5.2.2: Perception and Other Cognitive Abilities 5.2.3: "Meta-Incoherence" 5.3: Reliability and Basicality 5.3.1: Clairvoyance and Defeat 5.3.2: Experientialist Reliabilism 5.3.3: Early Reliabilism 5.3.4: Teleological Reliabilism Chapter 6: Basic Beliefs 6.1: The Delineation Problem 6.1.1: The Desiderata 6.1.2: A Systems Theory of Basicality 6.1.3: Counterexamples and Replies 6.2: Intuitions and Beyond 6.2.1: Descriptive and Normative Epistemology 6.2.2: Cognitive Science and Basicality 6.2.3: Illustration: Why My Philosophy is More God-Friendly than Plantinga's 6.2.4: Reflective Equilibrium and Etiological Constraints Chapter 7: Basic and Nonbasic Beliefs in a Reliabilist Epistemology 7.1: Toward a Theory of Justification 7.1.1 7.1.2: Defeat 7.1.3: Outline of a Theory; 7.2: Internalism and Externalism 7.3: The Problem(s) of the External World References Index