| List of Tables | p. xi |
| List of Figures | p. xii |
| Preface and Acknowledgements | p. xiii |
| List of Abbreviations | p. xv |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Overview of the argument | p. 3 |
| Case studies | p. 4 |
| Methodology: selection of the units of analysis | p. 6 |
| Domestic institutions | p. 6 |
| Economic importance of the EU, US, Brazil, and Australia in the WTO | p. 8 |
| Actors' positions on agricultural trade liberalization | p. 10 |
| Sources | p. 11 |
| Chapters' overview | p. 12 |
| Setting the Stage | |
| Framework for Analysis of Negotiations | p. 17 |
| Two-level games literature and trade policy: an overview | p. 17 |
| International-level explanations | p. 18 |
| Domestic-level explanations: society- and state-centred approaches | p. 19 |
| Domestic institutions | p. 22 |
| Executive-legislative relations | p. 24 |
| Number of veto players | p. 25 |
| Link between parties and interest groups | p. 27 |
| Domestic constraints and international negotiations | p. 28 |
| Integrative and distributive bargaining | p. 28 |
| International level: the time dimension of negotiations | p. 29 |
| Time dimension and concession rates | p. 29 |
| Time pressure: elapsed time and concession rates | p. 30 |
| Best alternative to a negotiated agreement | p. 33 |
| Repetitive games and tough bargaining strategies | p. 34 |
| Conclusion | p. 34 |
| Multilateral Agricultural Trade Regime | p. 36 |
| Introduction | p. 36 |
| Evolution of international trade cooperation | p. 36 |
| Uruguay round negotiations 1986-94 | p. 38 |
| Inclusion of agriculture in the negotiating agenda | p. 38 |
| First negotiating phase: 1986-8 | p. 39 |
| Second negotiating phase: 1989-90 | p. 40 |
| Final negotiating phase: 1991-3 | p. 41 |
| Agreement on agriculture of the Uruguay round | p. 42 |
| Market access | p. 42 |
| Export subsidies | p. 43 |
| Domestic support and the system of boxes | p. 44 |
| Impact of the agreement on agriculture on domestic support | p. 45 |
| Conclusion | p. 46 |
| Domestic Institutions | |
| US Trade Politics | p. 51 |
| Introduction | p. 51 |
| Power delegation in US trade politics | p. 53 |
| Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and beyond | p. 54 |
| Failure to ratify the International Trade Organization charter | p. 54 |
| Trade Expansion Act and Trade Adjustment Assistance of 1962 | p. 55 |
| Enactment of fast track negotiating authority in 1974 | p. 57 |
| Strengthening congressional oversight in the 1980s | p. 58 |
| Current provisions of fast track negotiating authority | p. 59 |
| Ex ante congressional oversight procedures | p. 60 |
| Ex post control mechanisms | p. 62 |
| Link between parties and campaign contributions of interest groups | p. 62 |
| Campaign contributions of farm organizations | p. 64 |
| Campaign contributions of commodity producer groups | p. 65 |
| US agricultural subsidies and international trade | p. 67 |
| US veto players 1999-2006 | p. 70 |
| Conclusion | p. 70 |
| EU Trade Politics | p. 73 |
| Introduction | p. 73 |
| Institutional structure of the EU political system | p. 75 |
| Evolution of EU trade politics | p. 78 |
| Delegation of power and control mechanisms | p. 79 |
| Ex ante control mechanisms: the negotiating mandate | p. 80 |
| Control mechanisms at locum: the 133 Committee | p. 81 |
| Ex post control: voluntary and involuntary defection | p. 82 |
| Actors' positions on agricultural trade liberalization | p. 83 |
| Member states | p. 83 |
| European Commission | p. 85 |
| Farmer and business groups | p. 86 |
| Domestic-level institutions in France | p. 87 |
| Structure of the executive | p. 87 |
| Link between parties and farmer groups | p. 88 |
| The Common Agricultural Policy and international trade | p. 90 |
| Conclusion | p. 92 |
| Brazilian Trade Politics | p. 94 |
| Introduction | p. 94 |
| Brazilian trade politics | p. 95 |
| National economic development model 1930-45 | p. 95 |
| Trade politics under democratic governments 1946-64 | p. 95 |
| Protectionist industrialization model 1964-85 | p. 96 |
| Adoption of a more liberal trade policy after 1985 | p. 97 |
| Decision-making process in trade policy | p. 98 |
| High party fragmentation | p. 99 |
| Link between parties and interest groups | p. 102 |
| Veto players in Brazil 1999-2006 | p. 103 |
| The Brazilian agricultural sector | p. 106 |
| Conclusion | p. 106 |
| Australian Trade Politics | p. 109 |
| Introduction | p. 109 |
| Australian trade politics | p. 110 |
| Australia's trade dependence on Great Britain until 1956 | p. 110 |
| Trade policy of Liberal-Country governments 1956-72 | p. 110 |
| First tariff reductions of the Labor government 1972-5 | p. 111 |
| Increasing protection under Liberal-National governments 1975-83 | p. 112 |
| Multilateralism under Labor governments 1983-96 | p. 113 |
| Bilateralism under Liberal-National governments 1996-2007 | p. 114 |
| A 'Westminster-inspired' democracy | p. 115 |
| Decision-making process in trade policy | p. 116 |
| Link between parties and interest groups | p. 117 |
| Veto players in Australia 1999-2006 | p. 118 |
| The Australian agricultural sector | p. 120 |
| Conclusion | p. 120 |
| Negotiating Trade Liberalization | |
| Seattle Ministerial Conference 1999 | p. 125 |
| International-level negotiations | p. 125 |
| Identification of issues and the initial negotiating positions of the actors | p. 125 |
| Deep divisions and no time pressure to make concessions | p. 125 |
| Domestic institutions | p. 128 |
| United States | p. 128 |
| Failure to renew fast track negotiating authority under a divided government | p. 128 |
| Position of interest groups | p. 129 |
| European Union | p. 130 |
| 1999 CAP reform and WTO negotiations | p. 130 |
| European Commission's negotiating mandate | p. 131 |
| Council-Commission relationship | p. 131 |
| Position of interest groups | p. 132 |
| Brazil | p. 133 |
| Informal consultations in trade policy | p. 133 |
| Parliamentary discussion on the Brazilian negotiating position | p. 133 |
| Position of interest groups | p. 134 |
| Australia | p. 135 |
| Anti-globalization campaign of the One Nation Party | p. 135 |
| Position of interest groups | p. 135 |
| Conclusion | p. 136 |
| Doha Ministerial Conference 2001 | p. 139 |
| International-level negotiations | p. 139 |
| A first assessment of actors' negotiating positions | p. 139 |
| Doha ministerial conference 9-14 November 2001 | p. 141 |
| Doha ministerial declaration on agriculture | p. 142 |
| Time framework for the Doha round | p. 143 |
| Domestic institutions | p. 143 |
| United States | p. 143 |
| Congressional negotiations on new trade and farm bills | p. 143 |
| Major provisions of the 2002 Trade Promotion Authority bill | p. 146 |
| Positions of major interest groups on the new trade bill | p. 147 |
| European Union | p. 147 |
| Council-Commission relationship | p. 147 |
| Brazil | p. 148 |
| Parliamentary discussion on trade liberalization | p. 148 |
| Australia | p. 148 |
| Establishment of the WTO Advisory Group | p. 148 |
| Conclusion | p. 149 |
| Cancun Ministerial Conference 2003 | p. 152 |
| International-level negotiations | p. 152 |
| Presentation of detailed negotiating proposals | p. 152 |
| The Harbinson text: trying to find a middle ground | p. 153 |
| EU-US joint proposal and the emergence of the G-20 | p. 155 |
| Cancun ministerial meeting 10-14 September 2003 | p. 157 |
| Domestic institutions | p. 159 |
| United States | p. 159 |
| The 2002 farm bill: increasing domestic support | p. 159 |
| Implications of the 2002 farm bill for WTO negotiations | p. 159 |
| Congressional reaction to the G-20 coalition | p. 160 |
| Position of major agricultural groups with respect to the G-20 demands | p. 160 |
| European Union | p. 160 |
| Modification of the Commission's negotiating mandate | p. 160 |
| The 2003 CAP reform: decoupling direct payments from production | p. 161 |
| Reaction of major agricultural groups to the CAP reform | p. 163 |
| Implications of the CAP reform for WTO negotiations | p. 163 |
| Brazil | p. 164 |
| A new heterogeneous governing coalition | p. 164 |
| Lula da Silva's trade policy | p. 165 |
| Workers' Party position on trade liberalization | p. 165 |
| Parliamentary discussion on the Brazilian negotiating position | p. 166 |
| Divisions within the governing coalition on the G-20 | p. 167 |
| Australia | p. 167 |
| Shift towards bilateral trade agreements | p. 167 |
| Free trade agreement with the US | p. 168 |
| Farmers' organizations position on the free trade agreement | p. 170 |
| Conclusion | p. 170 |
| Hong Kong Ministerial Conference 2005 | p. 173 |
| International-level negotiations | p. 173 |
| US and EU initiatives to move negotiations forward | p. 173 |
| The July 2004 framework for agriculture | p. 174 |
| Informal meetings and impasse in negotiations | p. 176 |
| Presentation of new detailed negotiating proposals | p. 176 |
| Hong Kong ministerial conference 13-18 December 2005 | p. 180 |
| Settlement of new deadlines | p. 182 |
| Domestic institutions | p. 182 |
| United States | p. 182 |
| Signature of the Central America Free Trade Agreement | p. 182 |
| Congressional discussions on the US negotiating position | p. 183 |
| Positions of farmer groups on the US negotiating position | p. 184 |
| European Union | p. 186 |
| Member states' reaction to the Lamy-Fischler initiative | p. 186 |
| Nomination of a new European Commission | p. 186 |
| Conflictual Council-Commission relationship | p. 187 |
| Brazil | p. 188 |
| Enlargement of the governing coalition | p. 188 |
| Economic policy and corruption scandals | p. 189 |
| Australia | p. 190 |
| Reaction of farmer groups to the Hong Kong meeting | p. 190 |
| Conclusion | p. 191 |
| Geneva Informal Meeting 2006 | p. 194 |
| International-level negotiations | p. 194 |
| New deadlines and the shadow of transatlantic trade disputes | p. 194 |
| Six weeks of intensive negotiations without any breakthrough | p. 196 |
| The Falconer draft text on hundreds of outstanding issues | p. 198 |
| Rejection of the '20-20-20' formula and breakdown of negotiations | p. 199 |
| Reaction of major players to the temporary suspension of negotiations | p. 200 |
| Major players' best alternatives to a negotiated agreement | p. 201 |
| Domestic institutions | p. 202 |
| United States | p. 202 |
| Congressional and farm groups' opposition to further concessions | p. 203 |
| European Union | p. 203 |
| Divisions within the Council on further concessions | p. 203 |
| Moving towards bilateral and regional trade agreements | p. 204 |
| Brazil | p. 204 |
| Pressure from interest groups | p. 204 |
| Australia | p. 205 |
| Reaction from interest groups and the Labor Party | p. 205 |
| Addendum: attempts to revive the Doha round after July 2006 | p. 206 |
| Conclusion | p. 207 |
| Conclusion | p. 209 |
| WTO negotiations so far | p. 209 |
| Summary of results | p. 213 |
| Time pressure and best alternatives to a negotiated agreement | p. 213 |
| Executive-legislative relationship | p. 215 |
| Number of veto players | p. 224 |
| Link between parties and interest groups | p. 225 |
| Limitations of the study and avenues for further research | p. 229 |
| Notes | p. 231 |
| References | p. 238 |
| Index | p. 263 |
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