Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons

With the passing of the Cold War, a chapter in the history of nuclear deterrence has come to an end. Nuclear weapons remain, however, and nuclear deterrence will again be practiced. Rather than simply assume that the policy of deterrence has worked, we need to learn the proper lessons from history in order to ensure that its mistakes are not repeated. Professor Lee furnishes us with the kind of analysis that will enable us to learn those lessons.
This book is the first post-Cold War assessment of nuclear deterrence. It provides a comprehensive normative understanding of nuclear deterrence policy examining both its ethical and strategic dimensions. The book poses the question: What kind of nuclear policy if any deserves both moral and prudential endorsement?
Professor Lee distinguishes what is essential to the nuclear deterrence relationship, and thus what we can expect to encounter again, from what is accidental, and thus merely a function of the particular political relationship between the United States and the former Soviet Union. It is only by grasping this distinction that we can hope to manage the nuclear menace in the future.
The book is principally a work of philosophy but it is written to appeal to scholars and advanced students in political science, international relations, security studies, and peace studies.