| Acknowledgments | p. xi |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Conditions for propositional knowledge | p. 13 |
| Belief | p. 13 |
| Truth as minimal correspondence | p. 23 |
| Truth as correspondence | p. 24 |
| The minimal correspondence definition | p. 26 |
| Criticisms and replies | p. 29 |
| Epistemic justification | p. 35 |
| Conclusion | p. 45 |
| Minimal epistemic reasons | p. 47 |
| Minimal epistemic reasons for belief | p. 47 |
| Propositional probability-makers | p. 52 |
| Against the Thesis of Self-Probability | p. 55 |
| Against Probability Infinitism | p. 56 |
| Circular Probability and Probability Coherentism | p. 60 |
| Summary and generalized argument | p. 63 |
| Nonpropositional probability-makers | p. 69 |
| Against Externalism | p. 71 |
| Against Radical Externalism | p. 71 |
| Against Moderate Externalism | p. 74 |
| A positive lesson | p. 77 |
| Internalism and unconditional probability-makers | p. 77 |
| Modes of awareness | p. 80 |
| Unconditional probability-makers | p. 88 |
| Internalism unified | p. 107 |
| Internalism and derivative probability-makers | p. 112 |
| Nonoccurrent probability-makers and memory | p. 117 |
| Conclusion | p. 125 |
| Justifying epistemic reasons | p. 126 |
| Justification and overbalancing probability | p. 126 |
| Unconditional overbalancing probability | p. 127 |
| Derivative overbalancing probability | p. 131 |
| The insufficiency of overbalancing probability | p. 134 |
| Justification and maximal probability | p. 136 |
| Unconditional and derivative justifiers | p. 136 |
| Justifiability and justifiedness | p. 141 |
| Some logical matters | p. 145 |
| Having a justifying reason for belief | p. 151 |
| The evidential basing relation | p. 156 |
| Against justification skepticism | p. 158 |
| Conclusion | p. 164 |
| Foundationalism and some alternatives | p. 166 |
| Foundationalism is not a mistake | p. 166 |
| Two problems for coherentism | p. 172 |
| A dilemma for internalist coherentism | p. 173 |
| The isolation objection | p. 176 |
| Against epistemological behaviorism | p. 183 |
| The given is not a myth | p. 186 |
| Epistemic reliabilism and relevant worlds | p. 194 |
| Three variations on reliabilism | p. 195 |
| Normal-world reliabilism | p. 196 |
| Reliabilism rejected | p. 202 |
| Conclusion | p. 204 |
| Procedural epistemic rationality | p. 205 |
| Cartesian truth-seekers | p. 210 |
| A plethora of epistemic objectives | p. 213 |
| Purely quantitative approaches | p. 213 |
| Nonquantitative approaches | p. 217 |
| An evidential epistemic objective | p. 223 |
| Conclusion | p. 231 |
| Propositional knowledge | p. 232 |
| Epistemic explanation and the Gettier problem | p. 235 |
| Knowledge and truth-resistant evidence | p. 242 |
| Knowledge skepticism and meta-justification | p. 255 |
| Knowledge and a Cartesian Dreamer Hypothesis | p. 255 |
| Explanatory particularism and the problem of the criterion | p. 260 |
| Conclusion | p. 265 |
| References | p. 267 |
| Index | p. 281 |
| Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved. |