Security assistance has become the largest component of international peacebuilding and stabilization efforts, and a primary tool for responding to civil war and insurgency. Donors and peacekeepers not only train and equip military and police forces, they also seek to overhaul their structure, management, and oversight. Yet, we know little about why these efforts succeed or fail. Efforts to restructure security forces in Iraq, Libya, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and the Democratic Republic of Congo ended amidst factional fighting. Similar efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Bosnia and Herzegovina helped to transform security forces and underpin peace. What accounts for the mixed outcomes of efforts to restructure security forces after civil war? What is the role of external involvement on these outcomes?
In Governing Security After War, Louis-Alexandre Berg examines the political dimensions of security governance through systematic, cross-country comparison. Berg argues that the extent to which state policymakers adopt changes to the management and oversight of security forces depends on internal political dynamics, specifically the degree to which leaders need to consolidate power. The different political strategies leaders pursue, in turn, affect opportunities for external actors to influence institutional changes through means such as conditions on aid, norm diffusion, or day-to-day participation in decision-making.
Drawing on an original dataset of security governance and field research in Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Timor-Leste, as well as mini-case studies of Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Somalia, Berg draws out novel implications that help explain the recurrence of civil war and the impact of foreign aid on peacebuilding. Moreover, Berg provides practical recommendations for navigating the political challenges of institutional change in conflict-affected countries. Ultimately, Governing Security After War seeks to explain the success and failure of international assistance in war-torn countries and sheds light on the politics of peacebuilding.
Industry Reviews
"International actors have long sought to help post-conflict societies build new militariesDLoften with mixed success. Berg's new book provides an illuminating explanation for why they are likely to succeed and fail. He shows how local political elites' struggles to consolidate powerDLand the resources and networks on which they relyDLshape the management and control of the armed forces. Fascinating and compelling, Berg's research is a major advancement in
understanding the character and origins of states' security sectors." -- Risa Brooks, Allis Chalmers Associate Professor of Political Science, Marquette University
"This is a fantastic book. Louis-Alexandre Berg demonstrates how a clearer understanding of the interplay between elite actors' interests in war-torn states holds the key to crafting strategies for lasting security sector reform. Wonderfully executed, this is an important contribution to the study of post-conflict reform. Arguing against the now common claim in the wake of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan that recipients of assistance inevitably lack
the political will to use it wisely, Berg shows how the right kinds of international attention to domestic political dynamics can leverage real domestic interest in reform. This well-written book is a
must-read for scholars and practitioners, and will have a lasting effect on how we think about security sector reform." -- William S. Reno, Professor and Chair of Political Science, Northwestern University
"Berg's volume, Governing Security after War, really sets the scene by providing an overarching framework to institutional interventions." -- Paul Jackson, International Peacekeeping
