| Preface | p. xv |
| Probability Theory | p. 1 |
| Basic Set Theory and Mathematical Notation | p. 1 |
| Probability Spaces | p. 2 |
| De Morgan's Laws | p. 3 |
| Interocitors | p. 3 |
| The Direct Evaluation of Probabilities | p. 3 |
| Probability as Frequency | p. 4 |
| Craps | p. 5 |
| A Marksman Contest | p. 5 |
| Sampling | p. 5 |
| Aces Up | p. 6 |
| Permutations | p. 6 |
| Combinations and Sampling | p. 7 |
| Mechanical Defects | p. 7 |
| Mass Defection | p. 7 |
| House Rules | p. 7 |
| The Addition Rule for Probabilities | p. 8 |
| A Guessing Game | p. 8 |
| North Island, South Island | p. 8 |
| Conditional Probability | p. 9 |
| Bayes' Rule | p. 9 |
| Extrasensory Perception | p. 10 |
| Les Cinq Tiroirs | p. 10 |
| Drug Testing | p. 10 |
| Color Blindness | p. 11 |
| Urns | p. 11 |
| The Monty Hall Game | p. 11 |
| The Logic of Murder and Abuse | p. 11 |
| The Principle of Insufficient Reason | p. 12 |
| The Greens and the Blacks | p. 12 |
| The Brain and Kidney Problem | p. 12 |
| The Value of Eyewitness Testimony | p. 13 |
| When Weakness Is Strength | p. 13 |
| The Uniform Distribution | p. 16 |
| Laplace's Law of Succession | p. 17 |
| From Uniform to Exponential | p. 17 |
| Bayesian Decision Theory | p. 18 |
| The Rational Actor Model | p. 18 |
| Time Consistency and Exponential Discounting | p. 20 |
| The Expected Utility Principle | p. 22 |
| Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function | p. 26 |
| The Scientific Status of the Rational Actor Model | p. 30 |
| Game Theory: Basic Concepts | p. 32 |
| Big John and Little John | p. 32 |
| The Extensive Form | p. 38 |
| The Normal Form | p. 41 |
| Mixed Strategies | p. 42 |
| Nash Equilibrium | p. 43 |
| The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory | p. 44 |
| Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria | p. 44 |
| Throwing Fingers | p. 46 |
| Battle of the Sexes | p. 46 |
| The Hawk-Dove Game | p. 48 |
| The Prisoner's Dilemma | p. 50 |
| Eliminating Dominated Strategies | p. 52 |
| Dominated Strategies | p. 52 |
| Backward Induction | p. 54 |
| Exercises in Eliminating Dominated Strategies | p. 55 |
| Subgame Perfection | p. 57 |
| Stackelberg Leadership | p. 59 |
| The Second-Price Auction | p. 59 |
| The Mystery of Kidnapping | p. 60 |
| The Eviction Notice | p. 62 |
| Hagar's Battles | p. 62 |
| Military Strategy | p. 63 |
| The Dr. Strangelove Game | p. 64 |
| Strategic Voting | p. 64 |
| Nuisance Suits | p. 65 |
| An Armaments Game | p. 67 |
| Football Strategy | p. 67 |
| Poker with Bluffing | p. 68 |
| The Little Miss Muffet Game | p. 69 |
| Cooperation with Overlapping Generations | p. 70 |
| Dominance-Solvable Games | p. 71 |
| Agent-based Modeling | p. 72 |
| Why Play a Nash Equilibrium? | p. 75 |
| Modeling the Finitely-Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma | p. 77 |
| Review of Basic Concepts | p. 79 |
| Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria | p. 80 |
| Price Matching as Tacit Collusion | p. 80 |
| Competition on Main Street | p. 81 |
| Markets as Disciplining Devices: Allied Widgets | p. 81 |
| The Tobacco Market | p. 87 |
| The Klingons and the Snarks | p. 87 |
| Chess: The Trivial Pastime | p. 88 |
| No-Draw, High-Low Poker | p. 89 |
| An Agent-based Model of No-Draw, High-Low Poker | p. 91 |
| The Truth Game | p. 92 |
| The Rubinstein Bargaining Model | p. 94 |
| Bargaining with Heterogeneous Impatience | p. 96 |
| Bargaining with One Outside Option | p. 97 |
| Bargaining with Dual Outside Options | p. 98 |
| Huey, Dewey, and Louie Split a Dollar | p. 102 |
| Twin Sisters | p. 104 |
| The Samaritan's Dilemma | p. 104 |
| The Rotten Kid Theorem | p. 106 |
| The Shopper and the Fish Merchant | p. 107 |
| Pure Coordination Games | p. 109 |
| Pick Any Number | p. 109 |
| Pure Coordination Games: Experimental Evidence | p. 110 |
| Introductory Offers | p. 111 |
| Web Sites (for Spiders) | p. 112 |
| Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria | p. 116 |
| The Algebra of Mixed Strategies | p. 116 |
| Lions and Antelope | p. 117 |
| A Patent Race | p. 118 |
| Tennis Strategy | p. 119 |
| Preservation of Ecology Game | p. 119 |
| Hard Love | p. 120 |
| Advertising Game | p. 12 |
| Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved. |
