| A General Theory and Statistical Evidence | |
| Theory | p. 3 |
| Output, Not Price, Reflects Economic Performance | p. 4 |
| An Informal Model of Pressure-Group Politics | p. 4 |
| A Formal Check on Our Intuition | p. 6 |
| Robustness to Assumptions | p. 8 |
| What if Policy Credibility Is Important? | p. 8 |
| What if "Real Options" Are Important? | p. 11 |
| Conclusion and a Look Ahead | p. 11 |
| References | p. 12 |
| Natural Experiments | p. 15 |
| General Requirements for a Natural Experiment | p. 15 |
| Experimental Conditions in the Telecommunications Sector | p. 17 |
| What Should We See if Democratic Governance Goes Too Far in This Application? | p. 18 |
| Conclusion | p. 20 |
| References | p. 21 |
| Statistical Evidence | p. 23 |
| An Empirical Proxy for Economic Performance | p. 24 |
| Proxies for Democratic Governance | p. 27 |
| Restrictions on Campaign Contributions | p. 27 |
| Alternative Measures of Democratic Governance | p. 28 |
| From Correlation to Evidence of Causation | p. 31 |
| Holding Supply and Demand Conditions Constant | p. 31 |
| Subtracting Even the Maximum Bias from Our Coefficient Estimate Leaves a Large Result | p. 33 |
| Results from Synthetic Experiments Add Even More Confidence That Accountability Went Too Far | p. 36 |
| Conclusion | p. 41 |
| Appendix A | p. 42 |
| Appendix B | p. 43 |
| Appendix C | p. 45 |
| References | p. 46 |
| Implications for Political Bureaucracy, Competition Law, and Business Organization | |
| Politics | p. 51 |
| Electoral Accountability Can Weaken Policy Commitments: The Case of Monetary Policy | p. 52 |
| The Problem of Time Inconsistency, in Principle | p. 52 |
| Time Inconsistency and Monetary Policy | p. 54 |
| Unaccountable Monetary Policy Can Be More Consistent | p. 55 |
| The Case of the Fed | p. 58 |
| Electoral Accountability Can Fuel Redistributive Pressures | p. 60 |
| Property Rights Can Be Stronger in Oligarchies | p. 60 |
| Deficits Can Encourage More Productive Government Spending | p. 61 |
| Insulated Judges Can Seek Truths and Ignore Inefficient Distributive Pressures from Aggregating Preferences | p. 64 |
| Conclusion: When Can Policy Benefit from Undemocratic Processes? | p. 66 |
| References | p. 67 |
| Law | p. 69 |
| Competition Policy Can Strengthen Economic Performance | p. 70 |
| But Legal Ideals Must Work Within Political Constraints | p. 71 |
| Producers Lobby for Market Power, Not Efficiency | p. 72 |
| Consumers Also Have an Interest in Inefficiency | p. 74 |
| Case Study: Do Consumer Interests Weigh Too Heavily on Insurance Regulation? | p. 75 |
| Insurance Can Improve Economic Welfare | p. 76 |
| But Promises Are Hard to Keep | p. 79 |
| Restricting Credit-Based Insurance Scores Can Overly Favor Consumers | p. 80 |
| Regulation Through Litigation Can Overly Favor Consumers | p. 82 |
| Rate Regulation Can Facilitate Consumer Monopsonies Instead of Checking Producer Monopolies | p. 84 |
| Tail Risks and Term Limits | p. 87 |
| How Big Is This Problem? | p. 90 |
| Governance Opportunities | p. 91 |
| What Can Politics Do Better? | p. 92 |
| What Can the Law Do Better? | p. 93 |
| What Can Business Do Better? | p. 93 |
| References | p. 94 |
| Business | p. 97 |
| Widespread Support for Increasing Accountability to Shareholders | p. 98 |
| Strengthening Shareholder Democracy: Policy Developments | p. 100 |
| Can Accountability to Shareholders Go Too Far? | p. 101 |
| Shareholder Democracy Can Destabilize Business Strategy | p. 101 |
| Shareholder Democracy Can Put Other Stakeholders at Risk of Inefficient Takings | p. 104 |
| Diffuse Ownership Weakens Shareholder Democracy, but Strengthens Commitments Against Opportunism | p. 106 |
| Evidence on How Weakening Shareholder Democracy Can Improve Corporate Performance | p. 107 |
| Strong Shareholders, Not Weak Ones, Award Golden Parachutes | p. 108 |
| Bondholders Demand Compensation for Risks from Strong Shareholder Rights | p. 111 |
| Value-Maximizing Venture Capitalists Also Protect Against Strong Shareholders | p. 111 |
| Quandaries in Macro- and Micro-governance | p. 112 |
| References | p. 115 |
| Conclusion | p. 117 |
| Index | p. 121 |
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