| Stochastic Cooperative Games: Theory and Applications | p. 1 |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Cooperative Decision-Making under Risk | p. 5 |
| Chance-Constrained Games | p. 5 |
| Stochastic Cooperative Games with Transfer Payments | p. 8 |
| Stochastic Cooperative Games without Transfer Payments | p. 11 |
| Cost Allocation in a Network Tree | p. 15 |
| Bankruptcy Problems with Random Estate | p. 19 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 23 |
| Sequencing Games: a Survey | p. 27 |
| Introduction | p. 27 |
| Games Related to Sequencing Games | p. 29 |
| Sequencing Situations and Sequencing Games | p. 31 |
| On Sequencing Games with Ready Times or Due Dates | p. 36 |
| On Sequencing Games with Multiple Machines | p. 40 |
| On Sequencing Games with more Admissible Rearrangements | p. 45 |
| Game Theory and the Market | p. 51 |
| Introduction | p. 51 |
| Von Neumann, Morgenstern and Nash | p. 52 |
| Bargaining | p. 57 |
| Markets | p. 61 |
| Auctions | p. 69 |
| Conclusion | p. 77 |
| On the Number of Extreme Points of the Core of a Transferable Utility Game | p. 83 |
| Introduction | p. 83 |
| Main Results | p. 85 |
| The Core of a Transferable Utility Game | p. 88 |
| Strict Exact Games | p. 91 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 94 |
| Consistency and Potentials in Cooperative TU-Games: Sobolev's Reduced Game Revived | p. 99 |
| Introduction | p. 99 |
| Consistency Property for Solutions that Admit a Potential | p. 102 |
| Consistency Property for Pseudovalues: a Detailed Exposition | p. 108 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 116 |
| Two technical proofs | p. 116 |
| On the Set of Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game: a Survey | p. 121 |
| Introduction | p. 121 |
| Bimatrix Games and Equilibria | p. 124 |
| Some Observations by Nash | p. 124 |
| The Approach of Vorobev and Kuhn | p. 126 |
| The Approach of Mangasarian and Winkels | p. 129 |
| The Approach of Winkels | p. 131 |
| The Approach of Jansen | p. 133 |
| The Approach of Quintas | p. 136 |
| The Approach of Jurg and Jansen | p. 136 |
| The Approach of Vermeulen and Jansen | p. 140 |
| Concave and Convex Serial Cost Sharing | p. 143 |
| Introduction | p. 143 |
| The Cost Sharing Model | p. 144 |
| The Convex and the Concave Serial Cost Sharing Rule | p. 146 |
| Centrality Orderings in Social Networks | p. 157 |
| Introduction | p. 157 |
| Examples of Centrality Orderings | p. 159 |
| Cover Centrality Ordering | p. 164 |
| Degree Centrality Ordering | p. 168 |
| Median Centrality Ordering | p. 173 |
| Independence of the Characterizing Conditions | p. 177 |
| The Shapley Transfer Procedure for NTU-Games | p. 183 |
| Introduction | p. 183 |
| Main Concepts | p. 185 |
| Nonemptiness of Transfer Solutions | p. 189 |
| A Characterization | p. 192 |
| Applications | p. 195 |
| The Shapley Value | p. 195 |
| The Core | p. 196 |
| The Nucleolus | p. 198 |
| The [tau]-Value | p. 199 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 202 |
| The Nucleolus as Equilibrium Price | p. 205 |
| Introduction | p. 205 |
| Preliminaries | p. 207 |
| Economies with Indivisible Goods and Money | p. 208 |
| Preliminaries about TU-Games | p. 209 |
| Stable Equilibria | p. 210 |
| The Existence of Price Equilibria: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions | p. 216 |
| The Nucleolus as Regular Price Vector | p. 218 |
| Network Formation, Costs, and Potential Games | p. 223 |
| Introduction | p. 223 |
| Literature Review | p. 224 |
| Network Formation Model in Strategic Form | p. 228 |
| Potential Games | p. 233 |
| Potential Maximizer | p. 238 |
| Contributions to the Theory of Stochastic Games | p. 247 |
| The Stochastic Game Model | p. 247 |
| Zero-Sum Stochastic Games | p. 250 |
| General-Sum Stochastic Games | p. 255 |
| Linear (Semi-) Infinite Programs and Cooperative Games | p. 267 |
| Introduction | p. 267 |
| Semi-infinite Programs and Games | p. 268 |
| Flow games | p. 268 |
| Linear Production Games | p. 270 |
| Games Involving Linear Transformation of Products | p. 273 |
| Infinite Programs and Games | p. 276 |
| Assignment Games | p. 276 |
| Transportation Games | p. 279 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 283 |
| Population Uncertainty and Equilibrium Selection: a Maximum Likelihood Approach | p. 287 |
| Introduction | p. 287 |
| Preliminaries | p. 289 |
| Topology | p. 289 |
| Measure Theory | p. 290 |
| Game Theory | p. 291 |
| Games with Population Uncertainty | p. 292 |
| Maximum Likelihood Equilibria | p. 293 |
| Measurability | p. 297 |
| Random Action Sets | p. 299 |
| Random Games | p. 300 |
| Robustness Against Randomization | p. 302 |
| Weakly Strict Equilibria | p. 305 |
| Approximate Maximum Likelihood Equilibria | p. 308 |
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