| Series Foreword | |
| Preface | |
| Taking Development Seriously | |
| Is the Initial Architecture of the Infant Mind Modular? | |
| Prespecified Modules versus a Process of Modularization | |
| What Constitutes a Domain? | |
| Development from a Domain-General Perspective | |
| Development from a Domain-Specific Perspective | |
| Reconciling Nativism and Piaget's Constructivism | |
| The Notion of Constraints on Development | |
| New Paradigms for Studying Young Infants | |
| Beyond Domain-Specific Constraints: The Process of Representational Redescription | |
| The RR Model | |
| The Importance of a Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science | |
| The Importance of a Cognitive Science Perspective on Development | |
| The Plan of the Book | |
| The Child as a Linguist | |
| Language Acquisition as a Domain-General Process: The Piagetian Infant | |
| Language Acquisition as a Domain-Specific Process: The Nativist Infant | |
| The Infant's and the Young Child's Sensitivity to Semantic Constraints | |
| The Infant's and the Young Child's Sensitivity to Syntactic Constraints | |
| The Need for Both Semantic and Syntactic Bootstrapping | |
| Beyond Infancy and Early Childhood | |
| The RR Model and Becoming a Little Linguist | |
| From Behavioral Mastery to Metalinguistic Knowledge about Words | |
| From Behavioral Mastery to Metalinguistic Knowledge of the Article System | |
| Beyond the Word and the Sentence | |
| From the Nativist Infant to the Constructivist Linguist | |
| The Child as a Physicist | |
| Understanding the Physical World: The Piagetian Infant | |
| Understanding the Physical World: The Nativist Infant | |
| Constraints on Object Perception in Early Infancy | |
| Understanding Object Behavior: Innate Principles and Subsequent Learning | |
| Rethinking Object Permanence | |
| The Representational Status of Early Knowledge: Do Infants Have Theories? | |
| Becoming a Little Theorist | |
| From Behavioral Mastery to Metacognitive Knowledge about the Animate/ Inanimate Distinction | |
| From Behavioral Mastery to Metacognitive Knowledge about Gravity and the Law of Torque | |
| Representational Redescription and Theory Building | |
| The Child as a Mathematician | |
| Number Acquisition as a Domain-General Process | |
| Challenges to Piaget's View | |
| Number Acquisition as a Domain-Specific, Innately Guided Process | |
| The Role of Subitizing: Perceptual or Conceptual? | |
| Constraints on Learning How to Count | |
| The Representational Status of Early Number Knowledge | |
| Learning the Language of Counting and Mathematics | |
| Is Mathematical Notation Essential to Number Development? | |
| Reconciling Domain-Specific Counting Principles with the Failure to Conserve: Cultural Universals | |
| Becoming a Little Mathematician | |
| Metamathematical Knowledge: The Child's Changing Theory about Number | |
| Number in Nonhuman Species | |
| The RR Model and Number Representation in the Human Child | |
| The Child as a Psychologist | |
| The Piagetian View of the Child as a Psychologist | |
| The Domain-Specific View: Infancy Prerequisites to a Theory of Mind | |
| What Conspecifics Look Like | |
| How Conspecifics Interact | |
| Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Species | |
| What Is Special about Theory-of-Mind Computations? | |
| The Toddler's Theory of Mind | |
| Is Language Essential for Distinguishing Propositional Attitudes from Propositional Contents? | |
| The Child's Developing Belief/Desire Psychology | |
| The RR Model and Changes in Children's Theory of Mind | |
| Should Theory of Mind Be Set in a Broader, Domain-General Context? | |
| Is Theory of Mind Just Like Any Other Theory-Building Process? | |
| The Child as a Notator | |
| Does Precedence Imply Derivation? | |
| Notation from a Domain-General Perspective | |
| A Domain-Specific Approach to Notation | |
| Preliterate and Prenumerate Children's Notational Competence | |
| The RR Model and Early Notational Skills | |
| Biology versus Culture: The Paradox of Notational Systems | |
| Using the Notational Domain to Probe the RR Model and Microdevelopmental Change | |
| The Importance of Behavioral Mastery | |
| Constraints on Representational Redescription | |
| Implicit Representations and Their Procedural Status | |
| RR and the Progressive Relaxation of Sequential Constraints | |
| Exogenously Driven and Endogenously Driven Change | |
| Nativism, Domain Specificity, and Piaget's Constructivism | |
| Domain Specificity and Piagetian Theory | |
| Domain Specificity and Abnormal Development | |
| What Is Left of Piagetian Theory? | |
| Modeling Development: Representational Redescription and Connectionism | |
| Soft-Core and Hard-Core Approaches to the Modeling of Development | |
| The Basic Architecture of Connectionist Models | |
| Nativism and Connectionism | |
| Domain Specificity and Connectionism | |
| Behavioral Mastery and Connectionism | |
| Implicit Representations and Connectionism | |
| Explicit Representations and Connectionism | |
| What Is Missing from Connectionist Models of Development? | |
| There'll Be No Flowcharts in This Book! | |
| Concluding Speculations | |
| Notes | |
| Bibliography | |
| Index | |
| Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved. |