Most observers who follow nuclear history agree on one major aspect regarding Israel's famous policy of nuclear ambiguity; mainly that it is an exception. More specifically, it is largely accepted that the 1969 Nixon-Meir understanding, which formally established Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity and transformed it from an undeclared Israeli strategy into a long-lasting undisclosed bilateral agreement, was in fact a singularity, aimed at allowing Washington to turn a blind eye to the existence of an Israeli arsenal. According to conventional wisdom, this nuclear bargain was a foreign policy exception on behalf of Washington, an exception which reflected a relationship growing closer and warmer between the superpower leading the free world and its small Cold War associate. Contrary to the orthodox narrative, this research demonstrates that this was not the case. The 1969 bargain was not, in fact, an exception, but rather the first of three Cold War era deals on nuclear tests
brokered by Washington with its Cold War associates, the other two being Pakistan and South Africa. These two deals are not well known and until now were discussed and explored in the literature in a very limited fashion. Bargaining on Nuclear Tests places the role of nuclear tests by American associates, as well as Washington's attempts to prevent and delay them, at the heart of a new nuclear history narrative.
Industry Reviews
Or Rabinowitz provides a fascinating glimpse inside the hidden history of American efforts to persuade Israel, India, South Africa and Pakistan not to test nuclear weapons. * Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University *
Bargaining on Nuclear Tests is a fascinating study of a little-known aspect of how the Cold-War rivalry that played itself out in a number of different locales - Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. Central to the narrative is the U.S.-Israeli dance over Israel's nuclear program. Realizing that Israel had already developed a nuclear weapon, President Nixon, urged on by his National Security adviser Henry Kissinger, apparently agreed in private with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in 1969 that the United States would look the other way as long as Israel did not openly test a weapon. Or Rabinowitz sifts through the still-ambiguous evidence to tell a convincing and important story. * William B. Quandt, Professor Emeritus, University of Virginia *
Rabinowitz makes a strong case that the United States, as a last resort in dealing with nuclear proliferation, sought to bargain with Israel, Pakistan and South Africa to convince them not to test a nuclear weapon in response for backing off efforts to stop and roll back their nuclear programs. She provides some interesting information on the development of these three and the Indian nuclear effort and raises questions about whether and how the bargains were kept or broken on each side. An interesting read, especially for nuclear policy buffs. * Thomas R Pickering, former US Under Secretary of State, Ambassador to Israel, Russia, India and the UN *
[an] important contribution ... to the study of nuclear non-proliferation during the late Cold War and into the post-Cold War period. Rabinowitz offers a valuable work that draws together quite disparate threads and addresses the 'no testing' element of non-proliferation policy. By analysing this previously neglected component of US nuclear policy, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests provides a significant theoretical and analytical foundation for continued work on this fascinating subject. * Malcolm Craig, History *
