| Preface | p. vii |
| Introduction | p. ix |
| Overview of Chapters 1-12 | p. ix |
| Retrospective: Logic, Dialectic and the Practice of Rational Criticism | p. xx |
| Dialectic and the Structure of Argument | p. 1 |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Presumption and Burden of Proof | p. 2 |
| Do there have to be "objective standards" for assessing arguments? | p. 4 |
| Conclusion | p. 8 |
| Generalizing the Notion of Argument | p. 10 |
| Doxastic attitudes other than belief | p. 11 |
| Propositional attitudes other than doxastic attitudes | p. 15 |
| Nonpropositional objects of conscious attitudes | p. 17 |
| Conclusion: further questions | p. 19 |
| Logic, Epistemology and Argument Appraisal | p. 21 |
| Introduction | p. 21 |
| Appraising premisses | p. 23 |
| Suitability of inferential link | p. 26 |
| Conclusion | p. 31 |
| The Relation of Argument to Inference | p. 32 |
| Arguments and inferences | p. 32 |
| Inference | p. 39 |
| Logical pragmatics, argumentation theory and the evaluation of inference | p. 43 |
| Inconsistency, Rationality and Relativism | p. 46 |
| Why is inconsistency a fault? | p. 46 |
| How serious a fault is inconsistency? | p. 49 |
| When is it reasonable to tolerate inconsistency? | p. 51 |
| What about relativism? | p. 54 |
| Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc | p. 56 |
| Logic, Coherence and Psychology | p. 64 |
| Logic, Coherence and Psychology Revisited | p. 73 |
| Introduction | p. 73 |
| Understanding a domain as necessary background of any reasoning | p. 74 |
| Is the understanding of a domain susceptible of propositional or sentential representation? | p. 75 |
| Understanding, coherence and rationality | p. 78 |
| Logical Form and the Link Between Premisses and Conclusion | p. 81 |
| Preliminaries | p. 81 |
| Semantic entailments | p. 85 |
| Inductive inferences and Goodman's paradox | p. 89 |
| The effect of pragmatic considerations on the validity of inductive generalization | p. 95 |
| Conclusion | p. 96 |
| Argument schemes and the Evaluation of Presumptive Reasoning | p. 98 |
| In what sense does presumptive reasoning/argument constitute a sui generis class? | p. 98 |
| Are there normative argument schemes? | p. 100 |
| Presumption and Argument Schemes | p. 105 |
| Presumptive reasoning | p. 105 |
| Argument schemes | p. 108 |
| Do argument schemes have normative force? | p. 109 |
| What is the point of identifying argument schemes? | p. 111 |
| Cognitive Science and the Future of Rational Criticism | p. 113 |
| Cognitive science at the extremes | p. 113 |
| What if the eliminativists are right? | p. 117 |
| Logic, Dialectic and the Practice of Rational Criticism | p. 126 |
| Introduction | p. 126 |
| The nature of the undertaking to which these papers are devoted | p. 128 |
| Revisiting "Dialectic and the Structure of Argument"--the role of dialectic | p. 130 |
| Revisiting "Dialectic and the Structure of Argument",--relativism | p. 134 |
| Conclusion | p. 140 |
| References | p. 141 |
| Index | p. 145 |
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