Who One Is

Chapter I: Phenomenological Preliminaries x1. Appearings, Looks, and Phenomena x2. Appearings, Eide, and Possible Worlds x3. Possible-World Theory and Phenomenological Eidetic Analysis x4. Perspectives, Appearings and Givenness x5. General Remarks about the Phenomenological Reduction x6. Further Parallels in the Natural Attitude x7. Bracketing the World x8. The Setting of Phenomenology Chapter II: The First-Person and the Transcendental I x1. The Achievement of "I" x2. On the Reduction of the Nominative to the Accusative: Levinas and Henry x3. The Ineluctability of I-ness in Awareness and Self-Awareness x4. The Transcendental I: The Dative and Agent of Manifestation x5. Dasein, Being-in-the-World, and "Meontology" x6. Self-Awareness, Self-Blindness, and "the Externus Hypothesis" x7. First-Person Perspective A. Perspective B. Lived Perspectives are First-Personal C. Transcendental Phenomenology and First-Person Perspective D. Chisholm on Self-Presenting Acts E. A Note on Terminology x8. Reflection and the Itinerary of Consciousness x9. Non-Ascriptive Reference of "I" and the Degenerate-Soliloquistic Position Chapter III: Ipseity's Ownness and Uniqueness x1. Ipseity as Ownness x2. The Paradox of the Universality of the Unique I of each Person x3. A Note on "Soul" in Husserl x4. The "Pure" I x5. Ipseity and Person Chapter IV: Love as the Fulfillment of the Second-Person Perspective Part One: The Second-Person Perspective x1. General Problems about the Reducibility of "You" to Another Personal Form. x2. The Presence and Absence of "You" in Speech and Writing x3. Proper Names and the Non-Ascriptive Reference of "You" x4. The Referent of "You" and the Face x5. Some More Problems Regarding the Presence and Referent of "You" x6. "You" as Importunity and Invocation x7. Speaking about You in your Presence and "We" x8. Problems of Talking about "You" and "Me" x9. Substitutes for "You" x10. Possibility of the Dissipation of the Pronominal Relata by the Relations x11. The Problem of "You" as Another "I" x12. Some More Marcelian-Buberian-Levinasian-Ortegian Reflections Part Two: Love, Person, and Ipseity x13. Introductory Remarks on Love x14. Love, Empathic Perception, and Emotion x15. Does Love Aim at Union with the Other? x16. Love Is Not in Respect of the Qualities of the Other x17. The Affirmation of the Reality of the Other Ipseity in Love and Hate x18. More on the Relation of the Qualities of the Person to the Ipseity x19. Why One Loves, Why One is Loved x20. "Ontological Value" of Ipseity x21. Love and Politics x22. Concluding with the Help of a Foil Chapter V: The Ontology and Meontology of I-ness x1. On Knowing Who I am and Who Knows Who I am x2. Individuality and Individual Essence x3. "I myself" as Substance x4. The Uniqueness of the Transcendental I and Numerical Identity x5. A Kantian Foil x6. Da Capo Chapter VI: The Paradoxes of the Transcendental Person x1. General Remarks About Paradox in Phenomenology x2. The First-Person and Phenomenological Regional Ontology x3. Aporiae and Paradoxes Within Regional Ontology x4. Some Paradoxes of Human Subjectivity in Regard to Nature and World x5. The Spatiality and Bodiliness of the Transcendental Person x6. The Transcendental Person x7. Inalienable Dignity and the Transcendental Person x8. Transcendental Person as Microcosm x9. Transcendental Person as Necessary Being and Essence Chapter VII: The Death of the Transcendental Person x1. Death and Birth in the Natural Attitude x2. The Transcendental I and the Awareness of Inner Time x3. The Non-Temporal Character of the Awareness of Time x4. Freedom and Love's Contest with Death x5. The Beginninglessness and Endlessness of the Transcendental I Chapter VIII: The Afterlife, the Person and the Transcendental I x1. Wordsworth and Schopenhauer on Ignorance of Pre-Existence x2. Sleep as a Transcendental Phenomenological Theme x3. Sleep as the Brother of Death x4. Vedanta and Husserl on Consciousness, Sleep, and Death x5. The Conservationist Optic x6. Conceiving Personal Immortality and Resurrection: a Stranger in a Strange Land? x7. Aristotelianism and Metempsychosis: the Problem of Being a Stranger to Oneself in a Strange Land x8. The "Myself," Memory, and the Afterlife