Truth Without Objectivity

On the mainstream view of meaning, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know the conditions under which the sentence is true. This view, however, is challenged by non-objective sentances such as judgements of taste: these do not appear to be either true or false, but are generally taken to be meaningful. How can this conflict be resolved? Truth Without Objectivity examines different ways of resolving this fundamental problem, before developing and defending a relativist theory of truth. The standard solutions reject one of the claims above, by maintaining either that judgements of taste do have truth conditions in order to be meaningful. Max K/lbel argues that both of these proposed solutions are inadequate, and that a third well known position, minimalism, can only solve the problem if it is developed in the direction of relativism about truth. K/lbel defends the idea that truth is a neutral notion: a sentence's possessing a truth condition does not yet entail that it concerns an objective subject matter, because truth and objectivity are independent of one another. He argues that this notion of 'truth without objectivity' leads directly to a relativist theory of truth, and goes on to defend his form of relativism from the usual objections to such theories.