The Challenger Launch Decision

Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, Enlarged Edition

By: Diane Vaughan

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eText | 4 January 2016 | Edition Number 1

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"An in-depth account of the events and personal actions which led to a great tragedy in the history of America's space program." —James D. Smith, former Solid Rocket Booster Chief, NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center
When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, millions of Americans became bound together in a single, historic moment. Many still vividly remember exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. Diane Vaughan recreates the steps leading up to that fateful decision, contradicting conventional interpretations to prove that what occurred at NASA was not skullduggery or misconduct but a disastrous mistake.
Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. In a new preface, Vaughan reveals the ramifications for this book and for her when a similar decision-making process brought down NASA's Space Shuttle Columbia in 2003.
"Vaughn finds the traditional explanation of the [ Challenger] accident to be profoundly unsatisfactory . . . One by one, she unravels the conclusions of the Rogers Commission." — The New York Times
"A landmark study." — Atlantic
"Vaughn gives us a rare view into the working level realities of NASA . . . The cumulative force of her argument and evidence is compelling." — Scientific American