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Gridlock is not a modern legislative condition. Although the term is said to have entered the American political lexicon after the 1980 elections, Alexander Hamilton complained about it more than two hundred years ago. In many ways, stalemate seems endemic to American politics. Constitutional skeptics even suggest that the framers intentionally designed the Constitution to guarantee gridlock. In Stalemate, Sarah Binder examines the causes and consequences of gridlock, focusing on the ability of Congress to broach and secure policy compromise on significant national issues. Reviewing more than fifty years of legislative history, Binder measures the frequency of deadlock during that time and offers concrete advice for policymakers interested in improving the institutional capacity of Congress. Binder begins by revisiting the notion of ""framers'' intent,"" investigating whether gridlock was the preferred outcome of those who designed the American system of separated powers. Her research suggests that frequent policy gridlock might instead be an unintended consequence of constitutional design. Next, she explores the ways in which elections and institutions together shape the capacity of Congress and the president to make public law. She examines two facets of its institutional evolution: the emergence of the Senate as a coequal legislative partner of the House and the insertion of political parties into a legislative arena originally devoid of parties. Finally, she offers a new empirical approach for testing accounts of policy stalemate during the decades since World War II. These measurements reveal patterns in legislative performance during the second half of the twentieth century, showing the frequency of policy deadlock and the legislative stages at which it has most often emerged in the postwar period. Binder uses the new measure of stalemate to explain empirical patterns in the frequency of gridlock. The results weave together the effects of institutions and elections and place in perspective the impact of divided government on legislative performance. The conclusion addresses the consequences of legislative stalemate, assessing whether and to what degree deadlock might affect electoral fortunes, political ambitions, and institutional reputations of legislators and presidents. The results suggest that recurring episodes of stalemate pose a dilemma for legislators and others who care about the institutional standing and capacity of Congress. Binder encourages scholars, political observers, and lawmakers to consider modest reforms that could have strong and salutary effects on the institutional standing and legitimacy of Congress and the president.
"Industry Reviews
"In this cogent account of the theory and practice of legislating in the American system, Sarah Binder demonstrates that party and bicameralism matter. Binder shows that differences in policy views across institutions might slow the enactment of new law, force compromise, or even produce stalemate. If she's right, and I think she is, then every American who cares about the quality of national governance must understand her argument and evidence." -Steven S. Smith, Washington University in St. Louis, 2/1/2003
|"One way to analyze lawmaking is to see how many bills pass as a proportion of proposals seriously considered. This book carries out that logic exceptionally well. Along the way it offers many nice insights about bicameralism, the Senate, the Clinton era, and in general the whys and wherefores of legislating. For students of Congress the book is a must-read." -David R. Mayhew, Yale University, 2/1/2003
|" Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock is a persuasive and innovative book and it is this reader's hope that it will be a launching point for a new avenue of research on U.S. federal policy making." -Wendy J. Schiller, Brown University, Congress & The Presidency, 9/1/2003
|"In this superb book, Sarah Binder addresses several questions that are central to contemporary scholarship about American national government.... This brief volume is a major addition to the scholarly literature about lawmaking, and thus merits sustained attention from scholars and graduate students.... Stalemate is a remarkable book." -C. Lawrence Evans, College of William and Mary, Perspectives on Politics, 3/1/2004
|"... don't be misled by the size of the book. Binder has produced a deep and insghtful work that ranges from the views and expectations of the Framers to the unexpected development of an activist and vibrant Senate and the rising role of parties to the contemporary Congress, offering a slew of hypotheses about what stalemate is, when and why it occurs, and a creative and rich data analysis of more than five decades of congressional performance with which to test them.... This is a fine book filled with insights: a case study in careful, systematic, and nuanced research that should be read by anyone interested in legislatures and in policy making generally." -Norman J. Ornstein, The American Enterprise Institute, Political Science Quarterly, 4/1/2004
|"Binder makes a solid contribution to a continuing scholarly discussion of the causes and consequences of legislative stalemate." -R. E. Dewhirst, Northwest Missouri State University, Choice, 11/1/2003
|"Using 54 years of institutional, electoral, partisan, and policy material, Sarah Binder has written a commanding study of the incidence, the explanation, and the consequences of divided government and bicameral deadlock in Congress. Innovative in its exploratory range and its explanatory precision, Stalemate is contemporary political science at its very best. It is a 'must-read' book for all who wonder and worry about the performance and possibilities of our national policymaking institutions.
" -Richard Fenno, Distinguished University Professor and Kenan Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, 2/1/2003
| Foreword | p. xi |
| Acknowledgments | p. xiii |
| Stalemate in Legislative Politics | p. 1 |
| "A Way of Life and Law" | p. 3 |
| Stalemate in a Madisonian System | p. 4 |
| Plan of the Book | p. 10 |
| Unintended Consequences of Constitutional Design | p. 12 |
| Consequences of Senate Change | p. 15 |
| Consequences of Political Parties | p. 19 |
| External Influences on Congress | p. 27 |
| Some Other Alternatives | p. 30 |
| Summary | p. 32 |
| Measuring the Frequency of Stalemate | p. 34 |
| Defining and Measuring Gridlock | p. 35 |
| The Denominator: Size of the Policy Agenda | p. 38 |
| Patterns of Legislative Gridlock | p. 40 |
| The Location of Gridlock | p. 44 |
| Gridlock at Water's Edge: Foreign and Domestic Agendas | p. 52 |
| Conclusion | p. 55 |
| Institutional and Electoral Sources of Stalemate | p. 57 |
| Constructing an Empirical Test | p. 60 |
| Explaining the Patterns | p. 67 |
| Budget Gridlock: An Additional Test | p. 75 |
| Institutions and Elections Revisited | p. 79 |
| What Drives Legislative Action? | p. 84 |
| Methodological Challenges | p. 84 |
| Preliminary Expectations and Evidence | p. 86 |
| Building a Model | p. 90 |
| Impact of Electoral Dynamics | p. 93 |
| A Closer Look at Bicameral Effects | p. 97 |
| Conclusion | p. 104 |
| Consequences of Stalemate | p. 106 |
| The Electoral Impact of Gridlock | p. 107 |
| Institutional Impact | p. 116 |
| The Dilemma of Gridlock | p. 123 |
| September 11 and Congress's Future | p. 130 |
| Appendixes | |
| Measuring Stalemate | p. 135 |
| Measuring Bicameral Differences | p. 140 |
| Alternative Specifications | p. 149 |
| Comparison to Mayhew, Divided We Govern | p. 152 |
| Data for Replication | p. 155 |
| Notes | p. 161 |
| Index | p. 195 |
| Tables | |
| Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Performance, 1947-2000 | p. 45 |
| Where Do Bills Die? 1947-2000 | p. 46 |
| Legislative Roadblocks after Initial Chamber Passage, 1947-2000 | p. 49 |
| Agenda Devoted to Foreign Policy, 1947-2000 | p. 53 |
| Does Divided Government Increase Gridlock? 1947-2000 | p. 61 |
| Estimating the Frequency of Gridlock, 1953-2000 | p. 68 |
| Simulated Probabilities of Gridlock | p. 69 |
| Impact of the Filibuster Threat on the Frequency of Gridlock | p. 72 |
| Does Ideological Disagreement between the Branches Matter? 1953-2000 | p. 73 |
| Delay in Adoption of Congressional Budget Resolution, Fiscal Years 1976-2001 | p. 76 |
| Impact of Elections and Institutions on Budget Conflict | p. 78 |
| Summary of Variables Used in the Analysis | p. 94 |
| Determinants of Legislative Success, 1993-96 | p. 95 |
| When Do Bills Die on the Senate Floor? | p. 99 |
| House and Senate Votes to Moderate Health Care Bills, 104th Congress | p. 101 |
| Relationship of Gridlock to Collective Electoral Fortunes, House of Representatives, 1948-98 | p. 109 |
| Impact of Legislative Performance on House Members' Collective Electoral Fortunes, 1948-90 | p. 110 |
| Impact of Legislative Performance on House Retirement Rates, 1948-94 | p. 115 |
| Impact of Legislative Performance on Congressional Approval, 1966-96 | p. 119 |
| Impact of Legislative Performance on Presidential Approval, 1948-98 | p. 124 |
| Change in Voting Behavior across Chambers | p. 144 |
| Impact of Divided Government, Alternative Specification | p. 150 |
| Impact of Public Mood, Alternative Specification | p. 151 |
| Comparing the Correlates of Legislative Gridlock and Productivity, 1953-2000 | p. 153 |
| Frequency of Gridlock, 80th-106th Congresses | p. 156 |
| Number of Failed and Total Agenda Issues in each Congress | p. 157 |
| Explanatory Variables | p. 158 |
| Figures | |
| Ideological Distribution of the Parties in the U.S. House, 1969-70 | p. 24 |
| Ideological Distribution of the Parties in the U.S. House, 1999-2000 | p. 25 |
| Size of the Policy Agenda, 1947-2000 | p. 39 |
| Frequency of Policy Gridlock, 1947-2000 | p. 41 |
| Frequency of Policy Gridlock on Salient Issues, 1947-2000 | p. 41 |
| Alternative Measures of Legislative Performance | p. 43 |
| Comparison of House and Senate Legislative Performance, 1947-2000 | p. 47 |
| Frequency of Policy Gridlock, Foreign and Domestic Policy, 1947-2000 | p. 55 |
| Legislators' Ideal Points in a Stylized Chamber | p. 64 |
| Partisan Moderation in the House and Senate, 1947-2000 | p. 66 |
| Comparing Measures of Bicameral Differences, 1947-70 | p. 146 |
| Comparing Measures of Bicameral Differences, 1971-2000 | p. 147 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
ISBN: 9780815709114
ISBN-10: 0815709110
Published: 25th February 2003
Language: English
Number of Pages: 222
Audience: General Adult
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing (AUS)
Country of Publication: US
Dimensions (cm): 22.86 x 15.11 x 1.12
Weight (kg): 0.3
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