| Fallacies and Cognition: The Rationale of Being Fallacious | p. 1 |
| The Appeal of Being-Fallacious | p. 2 |
| The Agent-Based Perspective | p. 4 |
| Proportionality and Relativity of Errors | p. 5 |
| How to Make Use of Social Characters | p. 7 |
| Argumentum ad Verecundiam | p. 7 |
| Argumentum ad Hominem | p. 9 |
| Argumentum ad Populum | p. 10 |
| The Question of Irrelevancy and Fallacy Evaluation | p. 11 |
| Gossip, Reasoning, and Knowledge | p. 13 |
| Ignorance and Knowledge | p. 13 |
| Reasoning through Gossiping | p. 15 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 18 |
| Bounded Rationality as Biased Rationality: Virtues, Vices, and Assumptions | p. 21 |
| Laying Down the Main Assumptions of the Bounded Rationality Model | p. 22 |
| Getting in the Dirty: Major Constraints and Problems | p. 24 |
| Procedures and Results | p. 25 |
| Explaining Successful Outcomes | p. 26 |
| The Notion of Heuristics | p. 28 |
| Emotions | p. 29 |
| Biasing Rationality | p. 30 |
| Introducing the Homo Heuristicus | p. 30 |
| Easy to Use: The Rationale of Biased Rationality | p. 32 |
| Appealing to Ignorance and Its Cognitive Virtue | p. 33 |
| The Vices of Biased Rationality | p. 35 |
| Competence-Dependent Information and Competence-Independent Information | p. 36 |
| Having Poor Information and Having No Information at All | p. 38 |
| Appealing to Knowledge: De-biasing Rationality | p. 39 |
| Plastic Behaviors and the Lens Model | p. 40 |
| Competence-Dependent Information Is Ecologically Delivered | p. 41 |
| When Biased Rationality Is Cognitive Ochlocracy | p. 42 |
| The Case of the Bandwagon | p. 42 |
| The Two Main Consequences of Cognitive Ochlocracy | p. 43 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 46 |
| Moving the Bonds: Distributing Cognition through Cognitive Niche Construction | p. 47 |
| Humans as Chance Seekers | p. 48 |
| Incomplete Information and Chance-Seeking | p. 48 |
| The Externalization Process | p. 49 |
| Bounds Moved: Prom Bounded to Distributed Cognition | p. 51 |
| Internal and External Resources | p. 51 |
| The Role of External Representations | p. 52 |
| Broad Cognitive Systems | p. 54 |
| The Extended Model | p. 56 |
| Cognitive Niche Construction: Distributed Cognition Evolving | p. 59 |
| Niche Construction: The Neglected Side of Evolution | p. 60 |
| The Notion of Cognitive Niche | p. 61 |
| Cognitive Niches and Distributed Cognition | p. 62 |
| The Future Enrichment of Cognitive Niches: The Case of Ambient Intelligence | p. 64 |
| Cognitive Niche Maintenance and Group-Selection | p. 68 |
| Cognitive Niche Maintenance | p. 68 |
| Finding Room for Group-Selection in Evolution | p. 69 |
| Group-Projecting Behaviors, Assortment, and the Stallation Hypothesis | p. 71 |
| An Eco-Cognitively Mediated Conception of Group Assortment | p. 73 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 74 |
| Building Cognitive Niches: The Role of Affordances | p. 77 |
| Cognitive Niche as a Set of Affordance | p. 78 |
| The Notion of Affordance | p. 78 |
| Affordances as Action Opportunities | p. 79 |
| Affordances as Ecological Facts | p. 79 |
| Affordances as Distributed Representations | p. 79 |
| Affordances as Evolving Interactional Structures | p. 80 |
| The Two Views on Affordance: The Ecological and the Constructivist Approach at Stake | p. 81 |
| The Two Views | p. 81 |
| Confronting the Evidences | p. 83 |
| The Breadth of Abductive Cognition | p. 85 |
| Affordances as Abductive Anchors: Going beyond the Two Views | p. 88 |
| Adapting Affordances and Cognitive Niche Enrichment | p. 91 |
| Adapting Affordances | p. 92 |
| Ambient Intelligence and Adapting Affordances | p. 93 |
| Why and When We Are Not Afforded | p. 96 |
| Hidden, Broken, and Failed Affordances | p. 96 |
| Not Evolved and Not Created Affordances | p. 98 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 100 |
| The Notion of Docility: The Social Dimension of Distributing Cognition | p. 101 |
| Altruism and Social Complexity | p. 102 |
| From Altruism to Docility | p. 105 |
| Docility, Learning, and Knowledge | p. 107 |
| Developing Docility: The Active Side | p. 107 |
| Docility, Learning, and Competence-Dependent Information | p. 110 |
| Who Is Undocile? | p. 112 |
| Bullshitting and Undocility | p. 112 |
| The Ostrich Effect: The Limits of Docility | p. 115 |
| The Open Source Model as a Case in Point | p. 119 |
| A Matter of Cognitive Reliability | p. 119 |
| The Docile Hacker | p. 120 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 123 |
| Seeking Chances: The Moral Side | p. 125 |
| Moral Proximity as a Leading Factor for Moral Understanding | p. 126 |
| What Is Moral Proximity? | p. 126 |
| Some Evidence on the Relevance of Moral Proximity for Moral Engagement | p. 128 |
| Moral Proximity Can Be Extended and So Can Our Moral Understanding | p. 129 |
| The Morality of Everyday Things | p. 130 |
| The Idea of Distributed Morality: A Cognitive Framework for Ethics | p. 132 |
| Epistemic and Pragmatic Actions: The Moral Side | p. 135 |
| Moral Mediators and External Representations | p. 138 |
| A Case in Point: The Internet as a Moral Mediator | p. 140 |
| Information as Democratic Resources | p. 141 |
| The Internet as a Community Builder | p. 142 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 143 |
| References | p. 145 |
| Index | p. 161 |
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