Robust Mechanism Design

The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs

By: Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris

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eText | 22 March 2012

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Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)

This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.

The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.

Sample Chapter(s)
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007) (33 KB)
Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction (252 KB)
Chapter 12: Robust Monopoly Pricing (174 KB)
Introductory slides

Contents:

Robust Mechanism Design
Ex Post Implementation
Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation
An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty
Robust Virtual Implementation
Multidimensional Private Value Auctions
The Robustness of Robust Implementation
Rationalizable Implementation
Pricing without Priors
Robust Monopoly Pricing

Readership: Graduate students and researchers who are interested in Economic Theory.