| Preface to the First Edition | p. xiii |
| Preface to the Expanded Edition | p. xvii |
| Introduction | p. 3 |
| The Theory of Direct Reference | |
| The Theory of Singular Direct Reference | |
| A Formulation of the Theory | p. 9 |
| The Orthodox Notion of Sense | |
| Descriptional Singular Terms | |
| Relationally Descriptional Singular Terms | |
| Orthodox Theories and the Theory of Direct Reference | |
| The Arguments | p. 23 |
| The Modal Arguments | |
| The Epistemological Arguments | |
| The Semantical Arguments | |
| Contextual Factors in Reference | |
| Rigid Designators | p. 32 |
| Two Kinds of Rigid Designators: Persistence and Obstinacy | |
| Proper Names, Nondescriptionality, and Obstinacy | |
| A Criterion for Obstinacy | |
| The Theory Extended to General Terms | |
| A Reformulation of the Theory | p. 42 |
| Descriptional General Terms | |
| Common Nouns as Proper Names | |
| A Point of Disanalogy | |
| Designation | |
| Relationally Descriptional Designators | |
| Orthodox Theories and the Theory of Direct Reference | |
| The Traditional Theory of Cognition and Understanding | |
| The Arguments Reconsidered | p. 59 |
| The General Form of the Arguments | |
| An Obvious Objection | |
| A Reply: Putnam's Twin Earth Argument | |
| Rigid Designators Reconsidered | p. 69 |
| General Term Designation and Rigid Designation | |
| A Criterion for General Term Designation | |
| Reference and the Necessary A Posteriori | |
| Some Consequences of the Theory | p. 76 |
| Traditional Assimilations | |
| Necessary A Posteriori Identities | |
| The General Phenomenon | |
| Other Alleged Necessary A Posteriori Truths | p. 80 |
| The Examples | |
| Trivial Essentialism | |
| Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning Natural Kinds | |
| Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning Individuals | |
| A Crucial Question | p. 87 |
| Putnam's Theory of Natural Kind Terms | |
| Putnam's Theses | p. 93 |
| Initial Exegetical Remarks | p. 99 |
| The 'is' of Instantiation | |
| A Gross Misinterpretation | |
| A Subtle Misinterpretation | |
| A Difficulty in Interpretation | |
| First Formulations | p. 106 |
| An Initial Formalization | |
| Time-Slices and Possible World-Slices of Continuant Individuals | |
| An Initial Attempt to Eliminate Possible World-Slices | |
| Cross-World Relations | p. 116 |
| Cross-World Construal of Binary Relations | |
| Intra-World Attributes, Extra-World Attributes, and Cross-World Relations | |
| A Mechanism for Generating Cross-World Relations | |
| Nondenoting Singular Terms | |
| Reformulations | p. 136 |
| A New Attempt at Formalization | |
| Thesis (T3) | |
| Reductionism and Analysis | |
| Translation into Modal Operator Discourse | |
| Further Exegetical Remarks | p. 148 |
| Theses (T5) and (T6) | |
| Thesis (T4) | |
| Thesis (T7) | |
| Thesis (T6) Again | |
| The Program to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference | |
| The K and I Mechanisms | |
| Putnam on (T9) | p. 161 |
| Donnellan's Elucidations of (T9) | p. 163 |
| The OK-Mechanism | p. 166 |
| A Valid Modal Argument | |
| The General Case | |
| The General K-Mechanism and the I-Mechanism | p. 169 |
| The General K-Mechanism | |
| The I-Mechanism | |
| The Program | p. 174 |
| Hidden Essentialism in the K and I Mechanisms | |
| The First Two Premises | p. 176 |
| The Third Premise | p. 176 |
| Putnam and Donnellan on the Third Premise | |
| Formalization | |
| The K-Mechanisms | |
| The I-Mechanism | |
| The Failure of the Program | p. 183 |
| The Original Argument | |
| The K and I Mechanisms | |
| Arguments for the Essentiality of Origin | |
| Kripke and the Putnam Program | p. 193 |
| Kripke's "Proof" of the Essentiality of Origin | p. 196 |
| Kripke's Formulation of Argument | |
| Some Initial Considerations | |
| The Compossibility Premise | |
| The Unfinished Argument | |
| A Principle of Cross-World Identification | |
| An Alternative Argument | |
| Compossibility Principles and Cross-World Identification Principles | p. 214 |
| Conclusion | p. 217 |
| Principles of Cross-World Identification | |
| Cross-World Identification Principles and the Ship of Theseus | p. 219 |
| An Argument for Contingent Identity | |
| A Fallacy | |
| A Better Theory | |
| The Four Worlds Paradox | p. 229 |
| The Argument | |
| One Solution | |
| A Better Solution | |
| Vagueness and the Paradox | |
| The Essentialist Principles in the K and I Mechanisms | |
| Donnellan vs. Kripke | p. 253 |
| A Problem in the Epistemology of Modality | p. 253 |
| The Nonmodal Consequences | p. 255 |
| Connecting Statements | p. 260 |
| The Need for Connecting Statements | |
| The Theoretical Status of the Connecting Statements | |
| Conclusion | p. 264 |
| Fregean Theory and the Four Worlds Paradox | |
| Fregean Theory | p. 265 |
| The Four Worlds Paradox | p. 268 |
| Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints | |
| Modal Paradox | p. 273 |
| A Modal Fallacy | p. 282 |
| Counterpart Theory | p. 286 |
| Modal Paradox and Sorites | p. 298 |
| Some Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory | p. 302 |
| More Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory | p. 312 |
| The Solution Refined | p. 321 |
| Vagueness and Modal Paradox | p. 326 |
| Twin Worlds | p. 331 |
| Necessity and Apriority | p. 335 |
| The Determinacy of Identity | p. 338 |
| Cross-World Identification and Stipulation | |
| Haecceitism, Reductionism, and the Problem of Cross-World Identification | p. 345 |
| A Residual Problem of Cross-World Identification | p. 356 |
| A Third Problem of Cross-World Identification | p. 362 |
| Letter to Teresa Robertson | |
| If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It | p. 369 |
| If It Is, Do | p. 371 |
| Naming, Necessity, and Beyond | |
| Substitution | p. 377 |
| Are General Terms Rigid? | p. 382 |
| The Necessity of Water Being H[subscript 2]O | p. 393 |
| Select Bibliography | p. 399 |
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