| List of Tables | p. xii |
| Acknowledgments | p. xiii |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Defining Putin's system | p. 1 |
| The purported lack of democratic ambition of the "Russian character" | p. 3 |
| A counter-example of this "lack of interest" | p. 4 |
| "Weimar Russia": The validity of a historical parallel | p. 6 |
| Putinism is not a fixed, but a dynamic category | p. 6 |
| Putin, Napoleon III, and Berlusconi | p. 7 |
| Putinism: An unstable system of hybrid "fascism lite"? | p. 8 |
| "Weimar Russia": The Validity of a Historical Parallel | |
| Russia and the Weimar Republic: Does a "Weimar Parallel" Exist? | p. 13 |
| Introduction: The danger of Praetorianism | p. 13 |
| From optimism to pessimism | p. 14 |
| The Weimar Parallel: The maturing process | p. 17 |
| The Weimar Parallel: Its five clusters | p. 19 |
| Geographical and demographic aspects | p. 21 |
| Lost territories: The great amputation | p. 21 |
| Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia: Two divided countries | p. 21 |
| National minorities: A ticking time bomb? | p. 22 |
| The "Weimar Parallel": Economic, Political, and Societal Aspects | p. 26 |
| Three economic crises | p. 26 |
| Simultaneity of problems | p. 29 |
| Praetorianism and the emergence of mass democracy | p. 29 |
| Extremist political parries | p. 30 |
| The undermining role of old elites in Weimar and post-Soviet Russia | p. 34 |
| The struggle for political symbols: The flag and the anthem | p. 36 |
| The installation of authoritarian rule | p. 38 |
| The proliferation of crime and political murder | p. 40 |
| Overcrowded prisons | p. 43 |
| Baby booms and angry young men | p. 44 |
| Bribery and corruption | p. 45 |
| An uncivil civil society: Lacking trust and social capital | p. 48 |
| The "Weimar Parallel": Socio-Psychological Aspects | p. 55 |
| Feelings of humiliation | p. 55 |
| The "stab in the back" legend in Weimar | p. 56 |
| The "stab in the back" legend in post-Soviet Russia | p. 57 |
| Conspiracy theories: Combating internal and external foes | p. 58 |
| Managing guilt: The unbearable burden | p. 60 |
| Stalinist atrocities | p. 61 |
| The Ukrainian Holodomor: A genocide? | p. 63 |
| The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the annexation of the Baltic states | p. 65 |
| Assigning and refusing blame: Are there opposed moral settings? | p. 69 |
| The Russian "commission to counteract attempts at falsifying history" | p. 70 |
| An example of "de-falsification": Poland's role in World War II | p. 72 |
| Establishing "historical truth" or fighting untruths? | p. 73 |
| Post-Imperial Pain and the Making of a New National Myth: The "Weimar Parallel": Socio-Psychological Aspects (Continued) | p. 76 |
| Post-imperial pain: Anger, pessimism, and mystical expectations of a great future | p. 76 |
| Dreams of the past: The dangerous nostalgia | p. 78 |
| From gloom to inflated visions of the future | p. 80 |
| The end of Communism and Russia's search for a new national myth | p. 81 |
| Grandiose imperialist visions: The world according to Igor Panarin | p. 82 |
| Aleksandr Dugin's Russian fascism | p. 83 |
| The imperialist dreams of Vladimir Zhirinovsky | p. 85 |
| Anonymous Russian monarchists: Tsar Putin? | p. 87 |
| Russian castration anxiety and Western fear mongers: Emmanuel Todd and George Friedman | p. 91 |
| Xenophobia, racism, and ultra-nationalism: The neo-Nazi revival in Russia | p. 93 |
| Conclusion | p. 96 |
| The Specter of a Fascist Russia | |
| What is Fascism? | p. 101 |
| Introduction: Putin the macho man | p. 101 |
| Russia: A "normal" authoritarian state? | p. 103 |
| Russia: An "unconsolidated fascist state"? | p. 104 |
| Fascism and the ideology of national rebirth | p. 106 |
| Putin's crypto-imperialism | p. 106 |
| Fascism: A "container concept"? | p. 109 |
| Ur-Fascism? | p. 110 |
| Fascism: A unique historical phenomenon or a universal concept? | p. 111 |
| Fascism: Deflating of a concept | p. 113 |
| Thin and thick methods: Formulating abstract definitions or building ideal types? | p. 114 |
| Defining Fascism: The "Thin" Method | p. 116 |
| The thin method: Roger Griffin's "fascist minimum" | p. 116 |
| A critique of Roger Griffin's definition | p. 117 |
| The three sources of the fascist imperialist drive | p. 119 |
| The omnipresence of war in fascist ideology and praxis | p. 122 |
| War as an event | p. 122 |
| War as an attitude | p. 123 |
| War as a source of recruitment | p. 124 |
| War as a means | p. 125 |
| War as an ideology | p. 125 |
| Defining Fascism: The "Thick" Method | p. 127 |
| The four dimensions of the ideal type | p. 127 |
| A political party with young middle-class leaders and its own party militia | p. 127 |
| A mythical political religion emphasizing virility and the leader principle | p. 129 |
| Ultra-nationalism, racism, and the restoration of national greatness | p. 131 |
| The symbiosis of party and state, corporatism, totalitarian control and an imperialist foreign policy | p. 133 |
| Discussion | p. 135 |
| Putinism and Fascism: The 11 Differences (Part I) | p. 137 |
| The 11 differences: An introduction | p. 137 |
| Taking power or receiving power? Putin's successful infiltration strategy | p. 138 |
| A post-hoc role for a presidential political party | p. 139 |
| The presidential party as a "centrist" party | p. 139 |
| No party militias | p. 140 |
| The Kremlin's official "anti-fascism" | p. 140 |
| The absence of state sponsored racism | p. 143 |
| The absence of totalitarianism | p. 145 |
| The role of the Orthodox Church | p. 147 |
| Putinism and Fascism: The 11 Differences (Part II) | p. 153 |
| The Siloviki: A new power elite | p. 153 |
| The Chekist legacy: A regime created by the secret police | p. 155 |
| Recomposing the divided beast: Toward a re-emergence of the former KGB? | p. 158 |
| The role of the Mafia | p. 160 |
| Putin's Russia as a "Pluralist Western-style democracy" | p. 161 |
| Are the 11 differences relevant? | p. 163 |
| The "Putinist dynamic of change", 2000-2012 | p. 166 |
| Putinism, Bonapartism, and Berlusconism | |
| Putinism and Bonapartism: The Ten Resemblances | p. 171 |
| Introduction | p. 171 |
| Putinism and Bonapartism: The ten resemblances | p. 171 |
| Napoleon Ill's democratic facade | p. 172 |
| Censorship and the suppression of the free press | p. 175 |
| The relative independence of the state | p. 176 |
| An outsider takes power | p. 176 |
| Law and order and the secret police | p. 177 |
| An ideology of national consensus | p. 179 |
| Bonapartism: Neither racist nor totalitarian | p. 181 |
| Religion in the service of the state | p. 183 |
| National prestige and modernization | p. 184 |
| The belligerent empire | p. 185 |
| Discussion | p. 186 |
| Putinism and Berlusconism | p. 189 |
| Berlusconi and Putin: The friendship of two Botoxed politicians | p. 189 |
| Putinism and Berlusconism: Some striking similarities | p. 192 |
| Berlusconi and Mussolini | p. 193 |
| Globalization and the ethos of personal enrichment | p. 195 |
| Globalization and the Mafia | p. 198 |
| Putinism: A Hybrid Mixture of Mussolinian Fascism, Bonapartism, and Berlusconism | p. 202 |
| Putinism is a system of its own kind | p. 202 |
| Putinism is a right-wing radical system | p. 203 |
| The Putinist dynamic: Why we can expect a further radicalization of the regime | p. 205 |
| Notes | p. 209 |
| Bibliography | p. 256 |
| Index | p. 265 |
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