Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium

This work examines the necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium. It delves into the mathematical underpinnings of this foundational concept in microeconomics, offering a rigorous analysis suitable for researchers and advanced students in economics and related fields. The authors, Charles D. Kolstad and Lars Mathiesen, bring expertise from the Sloan School of Management to bear on this topic, providing insights valuable for understanding market dynamics and strategic interactions among firms. This study offers a deep dive into the theoretical aspects of Cournot competition, a cornerstone of oligopoly theory, and contributes to the ongoing discussion about the stability and predictability of market outcomes.

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