| Foreword | p. xi |
| Acknowledgments | p. xiii |
| Introduction: Order: Old Problems, New Challenges, and Reusable Solutions | p. 1 |
| Old Social Problems | p. 1 |
| Infosocial Challenges | p. 3 |
| Emergent order Vs. Designed control | p. 4 |
| Actuality of Reputation: Spontaneous social Control | p. 5 |
| Impact on Infosocieties | p. 6 |
| About This Book | p. 6 |
| Purpose | p. 6 |
| Content | p. 7 |
| Assumptions | p. 8 |
| Caveats and Limits | p. 9 |
| Value-added | p. 10 |
| To Whom It Is Addressed | p. 11 |
| The State of the Art | p. 13 |
| Why Bother with Reputation? | p. 15 |
| Summary | p. 15 |
| Relevance of Reputation | p. 15 |
| Earlier Views | p. 16 |
| Honour | p. 17 |
| Dignity | p. 17 |
| Reputation | p. 19 |
| Fame | p. 19 |
| Static vs. Dynamic Properties | p. 19 |
| Current Views | p. 20 |
| What It Is: Current Definitions of Reputation | p. 20 |
| What Is It Good For? Fields of Interest and Applications | p. 21 |
| To Sum Up | p. 32 |
| Recapitulation | p. 33 |
| Theory and Practice of Cooperation: Focusing on the Reputed Agent | p. 35 |
| Summary | p. 35 |
| Cooperation: A Predicted or Effective Dilemma? | p. 35 |
| Game-Theoretical Expectations: The Prisoner's Dilemma | p. 37 |
| Cooperation, Social Order, and Centralised Institutions | p. 37 |
| Introduction to the Prisoner's Dilemma | p. 38 |
| Experimental Findings: More Cooperation Than Expected | p. 43 |
| Problems Left Open | p. 49 |
| Reputation and Trust: Complementary Notions? | p. 49 |
| What About Reputing Agents? | p. 49 |
| Recapitulation | p. 50 |
| The Shadow of the Future | p. 51 |
| Summary | p. 51 |
| Repeated Games in Pd: The Appearance of Tft | p. 52 |
| Finitely repeated games | p. 52 |
| Backward Induction on the PD | p. 52 |
| Infinitely repeated games | p. 53 |
| Axelrod's Tournaments: TFT Takes All | p. 53 |
| Simple Strategies Bring More Insight: Towards Reputation | p. 56 |
| Repeated encounters in Field experiments | p. 57 |
| Uncertainity brings out Reputation in finitely repeated games | p. 59 |
| The Chain Store Paradox | p. 59 |
| Uncertainty in the PD | p. 61 |
| Recapitulation and OPEN ISSUES | p. 62 |
| One-shot collaboration | p. 62 |
| Predictive power of rational cooperation | p. 63 |
| Reputation Transmission | p. 65 |
| An Alternative Prespective: The Reputing Agent | p. 67 |
| Summary | p. 67 |
| AIMS | p. 67 |
| A model of limited autonomous agents | p. 68 |
| Filtering beliefs | p. 69 |
| Filtering goals | p. 69 |
| Limited autonomy | p. 71 |
| A cognitive model of reputation | p. 71 |
| Image | p. 73 |
| Reputation | p. 74 |
| Reputation-based Decisions | p. 79 |
| Epistemic | p. 79 |
| Pragmatic-Strategic | p. 80 |
| Recapitulation | p. 81 |
| Advantages of Reputation Over Repeated Interaction | p. 83 |
| Summary | p. 83 |
| Introduction to the Sim-Norm Model | p. 83 |
| Purpose of the Model | p. 83 |
| The Problem of Norms | p. 84 |
| Description of the Model | p. 86 |
| Results in Homogeneous Populations | p. 89 |
| The Costs Of Compliance In Mixed Populations | p. 90 |
| Redistributing the Costs of Compliance: Image | p. 92 |
| Redistributing the Costs of Compliance: the Role of Reputation | p. 94 |
| Genetic bases for the spreading of reputation | p. 96 |
| Deletion Strategy | p. 97 |
| Parent Selection and the Mechanism of Reproduction | p. 97 |
| Findings | p. 98 |
| Recapitulation | p. 100 |
| Whether, Why, and Whom to Tell | p. 101 |
| Summary | p. 101 |
| Reputations: A Control Artefact | p. 101 |
| What Memetics Has to Say | p. 102 |
| Memetic Questions | p. 103 |
| Agent Requirements | p. 103 |
| The Memetic Model of Transmissibility | p. 104 |
| The Memetic Decision About Reputation | p. 104 |
| Whether and Why | p. 107 |
| To whom | p. 109 |
| About whom | p. 109 |
| How | p. 110 |
| Outputs of Memetic Decision: Some Hypotheses | p. 110 |
| Whether to Transmit | p. 111 |
| What to Transmit: Fidelity and Fallacy in Reputation Transmission | p. 112 |
| Overlapping of Roles: Predictions of the Model | p. 114 |
| Primary Consequences | p. 114 |
| Combined Consequences | p. 115 |
| Recapitulation and Suggestions | p. 117 |
| What Reputation is Good for | p. 119 |
| Reciprocal Altruism Reconsidered | p. 121 |
| Summary | p. 121 |
| The Problem | p. 121 |
| The Solutions | p. 122 |
| Reciprocal Altruism | p. 122 |
| TIT-FOR-TAT and the Evolutionary Metaphor for Reciprocity | p. 124 |
| In Search of Theory: How did Reciprocity Evolve? | p. 126 |
| Types of Reciprocity | p. 126 |
| Paths to Reciprocity | p. 127 |
| Anything Missing? | p. 133 |
| Cognitive Differences under Behavioural Convergence | p. 133 |
| The Adaptive Mind | p. 134 |
| Social Cognitive Artefacts | p. 137 |
| Recapitulation | p. 138 |
| Informational Altruism | p. 139 |
| Summary | p. 139 |
| Reputation and Gossip: Agent Property and Social Process | p. 139 |
| On Gossip | p. 140 |
| Definitions | p. 141 |
| Properties | p. 141 |
| Functions: Vis-a-vis the Society | p. 144 |
| A Weapon of the Weak | p. 148 |
| Follow-Up Questions | p. 149 |
| Gossip as Informational Reciprocal Altruism | p. 149 |
| Recapitulation | p. 151 |
| False Reputation | p. 153 |
| Summary | p. 153 |
| False reputation in social control | p. 153 |
| Expected Results | p. 154 |
| The Design of the Experiment | p. 155 |
| Expectations and findings | p. 156 |
| Asymmetry between Calumny and Leniency | p. 158 |
| Discussion | p. 160 |
| Advantages of the Present Approach | p. 163 |
| Social Impact of Reputation | p. 165 |
| Summary | p. 165 |
| Back to the Future: Extension and Social Impact of Reputation | p. 165 |
| Problems Still Unsolved | p. 166 |
| Advantages of the Present Approach | p. 166 |
| For Monitoring | p. 167 |
| For Action | p. 169 |
| Recapitulation | p. 171 |
| Reputation in Infosocieties | p. 173 |
| Summary | p. 173 |
| Online Communities | p. 173 |
| Misbehaviour in online communities | p. 175 |
| The problem of shifting identities | p. 176 |
| Reputation Systems in Infosocieties | p. 179 |
| Application-Level Reputation Systems: eBay | p. 179 |
| Research-level Reputation Systems | p. 182 |
| Reputation for Multi-agent Systems | p. 184 |
| To Sum Up | p. 187 |
| Recapitulation | p. 188 |
| Concluding Remarks | p. 189 |
| The Helix of Reputation | p. 189 |
| A Process-Centred Approach | p. 190 |
| Weapon of the Weak | p. 191 |
| A Prudence Rule | p. 191 |
| For a Dynamic Social Order | p. 192 |
| Virtues and Vices | p. 192 |
| God-less Machines and Social Machinery | p. 193 |
| Courtesy Online | p. 194 |
| Bibliography | p. 195 |
| Index | p. 207 |
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