List of Illustrations | |
Preface | |
Acknowledgments | |
Introduction: Exploring the Boundary between Politics and Science | |
Social Interests in Promoting and Controlling Science and Technology | |
Expansion of Government Support for Science, 1945 to the Late 1960s: The United States | |
Expansion of Government Support for Science, 1945 to the Late 1960s: The United Kingdom | |
Reassessing Science and Technology, 1965-1975 | |
Deregulation and Selective Growth: 1970s and 1980s | |
The Shaping of American and British Science Policy | |
The Social Transformation of Recombinant DNA Technology, 1972-1982 | |
Anticipations of Genetic Engineering, 1952-1970 | |
The First Gene-Splicing Experiments, 1969-1973 | |
Visions of a Commercial Future, 1974-1976 | |
Genetic Engineering Enters the Business Arena, 1976-1979 | |
The "Cloning Gold Rush," 1979-1982 | |
A New Commercial Ethos | |
A Transformation of Interest | |
The Emergence and Definition of the Genetic Engineering Issue, 1972-1975 | |
Social Interests in Genetic Engineering | |
Precedents | |
Emergence of the Recombinant DNA Issue, 1973-1974 | |
Initiating Recombinant DNA Policy in the United States and the United Kingdom, 1972-1976 | |
The Asilomar Conference, 24-27 February 1975 | |
The Asilomar Legacy | |
Initiating Government Controls in the United States and the United Kingdom, 1975-1976 | |
The Politics of the NIH Guidelines | |
Forming the NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee | |
Developing the NIH Guidelines, 1975-1976 | |
The Hearing before the Director's Advisory Committee, February 1976 | |
Promulgating the 1976 NIH Guidelines: Industry and the Public Enter the Policy Debate | |
The Politics of Genetic Engineering in the United Kingdom | |
The Williams Committee and the Formation of British Policy | |
Forming the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group | |
The American and British Policy Paradigms: Variations on the Asilomar Legacy | |
Defusing the Controversy: The Politics of Risk Assessment | |
The Spread of the Recombinant DNA Controversy | |
The Hazard Problem: A Case Study in the Closure of a Technical Controversy | |
The Meetings at Bethesda, Falmouth, and Ascot | |
Further Sources of "New Evidence" | |
The Politics of Risk Assessment | |
Dissemination/Legitimation | |
Derailing Legislation, 1977-1978 | |
The Politics of Government Control of Recombinant DNA Technology | |
Biomedical Research as an "Affected Industry" | |
The Rise and Fall of Recombinant DNA Legislation | |
The Political Impact of the Legislative Defeat | |
Revising the National Institutes of Health Controls, 1977-1978 | |
The Social and Political Setting | |
Revisions Proposed, 1977 | |
The Director's Advisory Committee Meeting, December 1977 | |
The Position of Private Industry, December 1977 | |
Cloning Viral DNA: The Original Problem Reassessed | |
Making the Changes: Initiating a Policy Reversal | |
Revisions Released, December 1978 | |
Operating the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group, 1977-1978 | |
The Social and Political Setting | |
The Politics of GMAG | |
Implementing the Williams Proposals, 1977 | |
Developing the Brenner Scheme, 1977-1978 | |
Dismantling the National Institutes of Health Controls: From Prevention to Crisis Intervention, 1979 | |
The Social and Political Setting | |
Industry, Academe, and the Politics of the NIH Controls | |
The Status of the Hazards Debate | |
The Wye Meeting | |
The New Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee | |
The Rowe-Campbell Proposal: The First Move toward Dismantling the NIH Controls | |
A Turn in Discourse and Policy | |
Dismantling the National Institutes of Health Controls but Preserving Quasi-regulation, 1980 | |
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