Methodological Variance

One.- 1 / On the Objects of Our Subjective Knowledge.- 1.1 What is Wrong with Traditional Epistemology?.- 1.2 The Nature of Subjective Knowledge: Traditional Analysis.- 1.3 Rational Belief, Objective Knowledge and Human Interaction.- 1.4 Ontological Presuppositions of Traditional Epistemology.- 2 / Human Knowledge and Human Interaction.- 2.1 Of the Philosopher's Obsession with Perception.- 2.2 The Problem of Perception.- 2.3 On Interaction with What Our Theories Invariably Single Out as Observables.- 2.4 The Problem of Human Interaction.- 2.5 On Understanding the Concept of Human Knowledge.- 2.6 The Knowing Subject and the Perceiving Organism: the Structural and Functional Asymmetry between Knowledge and Perception.- 2.7 The Essential Unpredictability of the Growth of Knowledge and the Problem of the Predictability of Interactions.- 2.8 From an Objectivistic Point of View.- 2.9 Organization, Information and Knowledge: Instructed Interaction versus Creative Interaction.- 3 / Indeterminacy of Translation: A Non-Quinean Function of Content-Indeterminacy.- 3.1 Science and Language: Problems of Theory-Choice and Translational Indeterminacy.- 3.2 Quine's Thesis of the Indeterminacy of Radical Translation.- 3.3 Translational Determinacy: Quine's Behavioral Criteria.- 3.3.1. Language Viewed as a System of Dispositions to Verbal Behavior.- 3.3.2. Methodological Indeterminacy of Propositions Conceived Non-Mentalistically.- 3.4 The Ideologically Neutral Problem of the Conditions of Translational Determinacy.- 3.4.1. The Criterial Character of Quinean Indeterminacy.- 3.5 Indeterminacy of Translation: a Non-Quinean Function of Content-Indeterminacy.- 3.6 Epistemic Structuralism: Problems and Propositions in Retrospect.- 4 / On the Impossibility of any Enterprise Concerning Self-Knowledge within Traditional Epistemology.- 4.1 The Traditional Doctrine of Self-Knowledge and the Concept of a Person.- 4.2 The Impossibility of Any Enterprise Concerning Self-Knowledge within Traditional Epistemology.- 4.3 First-Person Psychological Sentences: Selfconsciousness, Objective Knowledge and Human Interaction.- 4.4 Persons as a Subject of Objective Knowledge.- 4.5 The Philosophical Significance of Scepticism in Hume and Wittgenstein.- 4.6 The 'Private Language' Version of the Problem of Self-Knowledge.- Two.- 5 / Methodological Essentialism in Science and in Philosophy.- 5.1 Methodological Conventionalism in Science and in Philosophy.- 5.1.1. On the Subjects of Objective Knowledge and Carnap's Methodological Conventionalism.- 5.1.2. Science and Popper's Methodological Conventionalism.- 5.2 Essentialism in Philosophy: Popper's and Wittgenstein's Criticism.- 5.2.1. Philosophy of Science and Methodological Conventionalism of Popper.- 5.2.2. Conventionalism and the Game-Theoretic Conception of Science.- 5.2.3. The Tension between Objectivism and Conventionalism.- 5.2.4. Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend.- 5.2.5. Later Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language: Criticism.- 5.3 Models that Familiarize and Models that Formalize: Methodological Essentialism in Retrospect.- 6 / Of Variance and Invariance in Science: Empirical Science as an Enterprise ComprisingNFCPSSystems.- 6.1 The Problem of the Conditions of Objective Knowledge.- 6.2 The Structural-Dynamical Assumptions and the Ideal Type Assumptions in the Individual Sciences.- 6.2.1. The Subject-Specific Assumptions in the Individual Sciences: Some Case-Studies.- 6.3 The Subject-Specific Methodological Problems of Theory-Construction and Problem-Formulation.- 6.4 Two Concepts of Invariance: the Problem of Theoretical Universals.- 6.5 The Nature of Methodological Variance: Scientific Revolutions as a Function of Working Backwards from Rule-Entanglement.- 6.5.1. Of the Asymmetry between Scientific and Political Revolutions.- 6.5.2. Philosophy as a Higher-Order Enterprise: Against the Under-Labourer Conception.- 6.5.3. The Demarcation Problem: Empirical Science Viewed as a Game of Conjectures and Refutations.- 6.5.4. Methodological Aspects of Science as an Enterprise Comprising NFCPS Systems.- 7 / Falsifiability and Methodological Invariance in Science.- 7.1 The Principle of Falsifiability.- 7.1.1. The Argument from Logical Form.- 7.1.2. The Argument from Methodological Conventionalism.- 7.2 Theoretical Universals: Methodological Invariance in Science.- 7.2.1. Epistemic Structuralism and the Problem of Demarcating Science from Non-Science.- 8 / The Methodology of Theory-Problem Interactive Systems.- 8.1 The Question of the Nature of a Falsifiable Theory.- 8.2 How Simple is Theoretical Simplicity?.- 8.2.1. Problems of Simplicity: Different Approaches.- 8.2.2. The Probabilistic Model of Simplicity.- 8.2.3. The Popperian Model of Simplicity.- 8.2.4. Elliot Sober's Model of Simplicity.- 8.2.5. Re-Ordering Theoretical Simplicity: Towards an Interaction-Theoretic Model.- 8.3 Methodological Implications of Epistemic Structuralism.- 8.4 What is Wrong with the Received Views on the Methodology of Science?.- 8.5 Theoretical Universals and the Principle of the Resolving Power of a Scientific Theory.- 8.6 The Methodology of Theory-Problem Interactive Systems.- 9 / The Resolving Power of a Scientific Theory as a Basis of its Epistemic Appraisal.- 9.1 Methodological Variance: From Newtonian to Einsteinian Theory-Problem Interactive Systems.- 9.2 The Nature of Novel Prediction: Two Concepts of the Predictive Power of a Scientific Theory.- 9.3 The Methodological Role of Physical Theory in Relativistic Cosmology.- 9.4 The Resolving Power of a Scientific Theory as a Basis of its Epistemic Appraisal.- 10 / Epilogue.- Notes.- Index of Symbols.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.