| Preface | p. xi |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| The geography of the issues | p. 9 |
| Conceptual versus natural modality | p. 9 |
| Implications for philosophy and psychology | p. 13 |
| Of wolves and wolf-children | p. 16 |
| Stalnaker's intelligent Martians | p. 20 |
| Anti-realist arguments | p. 22 |
| Realism in mind | p. 25 |
| Innateness and theory of mind | p. 29 |
| Thinking: images or sentences? | p. 31 |
| Which language do we think with? | p. 40 |
| The evidence from scientific psychology | p. 40 |
| The evidence of introspection: images and imaged sentences | p. 49 |
| The scope and strength of the introspective thesis | p. 52 |
| Objections and elucidations | p. 55 |
| Fallible introspection and Fodor | p. 60 |
| Individuating propositional attitudes | p. 62 |
| Animals and infants | p. 65 |
| Language-learning and sub-personal thought | p. 67 |
| Thought-based semantics | p. 73 |
| The argument from foreign believers | p. 73 |
| Grice's thought-based semantics | p. 76 |
| Two objections | p. 78 |
| Searle's version of thought-based semantics | p. 83 |
| A marriage of Searle and Fodor? | p. 85 |
| Causal co-variance theories | p. 88 |
| Misrepresentation, and asymmetric causal dependence | p. 91 |
| The all Ss problem | p. 96 |
| Holism and language | p. 103 |
| From mental realism to Mentalese | p. 103 |
| The demand for scientific vindication | p. 105 |
| The problem of holism | p. 107 |
| Between holism and atomism | p. 111 |
| Arguments for holism | p. 114 |
| The need for a language-based semantics | p. 120 |
| Language-based semantics 1: functional-role semantics | p. 123 |
| Language-based semantics 2: canonical acceptance conditions | p. 127 |
| First steps towards a theory of consciousness | p. 133 |
| Retrospect: the need for a theory of consciousness | p. 133 |
| Conscious versus non-conscious mental states | p. 135 |
| Cartesian consciousness | p. 140 |
| Why Cartesianism won't do | p. 143 |
| What kind of theory do we want? | p. 147 |
| Kirk: presence to central decision-making | p. 150 |
| Higher-order discrimination and feel | p. 154 |
| The case for higher-order thought theory | p. 157 |
| Second (-order) steps towards a theory of consciousness | p. 164 |
| Theory 1: actual and conscious | p. 164 |
| Theory 2: actual and non-conscious | p. 166 |
| Theory 3: potential and non-conscious | p. 170 |
| Theory 4: potential and conscious | p. 174 |
| Dennett 1978: availability to print-out | p. 176 |
| Dennett 1991: multiple drafts and probes | p. 178 |
| Time and indeterminacy | p. 183 |
| Dennett on the place of language in thought | p. 187 |
| A reflexive thinking theory of consciousness | p. 194 |
| Reflexive thinking theory | p. 194 |
| Contrasts and advantages | p. 198 |
| Conscious versus non-conscious thinking | p. 201 |
| Objections and elucidations | p. 204 |
| The problem of unity | p. 208 |
| The problem of phenomenal feel | p. 212 |
| A Cartesian Theatre? | p. 217 |
| Animals and infants revisited | p. 220 |
| The involvement of language in conscious thinking | p. 225 |
| An architecture for human thinking | p. 225 |
| An evolutionary story | p. 231 |
| The argument from introspection revisited | p. 234 |
| Working memory and the central executive | p. 245 |
| The thesis of natural necessity (weak) | p. 251 |
| Objections and elucidations | p. 259 |
| The thesis of natural necessity (strong) | p. 263 |
| The scope and significance of NN | p. 269 |
| Conclusion | p. 277 |
| References | p. 280 |
| Index | p. 287 |
| Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved. |