Introduction to the Logical Investigations

The Author's Abstracts 1900/01.- Author's Abstract to Volume One in Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Vol. 24 (1900), pp. 511-12.- Author's Abstract to Volume Two in Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, Vol. 25 (1901), pp. 260-63.- A Draft of a "Preface" to the Logical Investigations, 1913.- I. Eugen Fink's Editorial Remarks.- II. Husserl's Text.- Section 1. The necessity of a preparatory introduction into the meaning of the work. - The Logical Investigations and the philosophical public.- Section 2. The sense of the "Prolegomena": the separation of the logical and psychological motifs within the unity of a single problem; (critical discussion on Natorp).- Section 3. The Demand for an intuitive method of philosophy in the return to intuitive experience (Anschauung).- Section 4. Repudiation of the charge of so-called "Platonism"; ideas as objects.- Section 5. The concept of pure logic as mathesis universalis (the unity of the "analytic" doctrine of forms for that which can be an object on the one hand with the categories of meaning on the other). The "positivity" of logic and the philosophical problem of its phenomenological elucidation. - Positive science in general and phenomenology.- Section 6. The Logical Investigations as a breakthrough work. - The antecedent history of its problematic: the beginning with the questions about the psychological origin of basic mathematical concepts; the study of Lotze and Bolzano. - The thematic orientation of the mathematician; its naive justification and the problem of a phenomenological turn.- Section 7. Critical discussion of Meinong. - Demarcations in the region of the a priori: The distinction between 1) the formal and material a priori, and 2) the "phenomenological" and "ontological" a priori.- Section 8. Critical Differentiation from Lotze.- Section 9. Critical differentiation from Bolzano.- Section 10. Repudiation of the slogan: "Phenomenology as the analysis of the meanings of words.- Section 11. A misunderstanding of the author's in the Logical Investigations. The misleading characterization of phenomenology as descriptive psychology.- Section 12. The charge of "logicism"; critical discussion on Wilhelm Wundt.