| Preface | |
| Acknowledgments | |
| Value, plurality, parts, and wholes | |
| The concept of intrinsic value | p. 3 |
| Correct emotion and intrinsic value | p. 6 |
| Some objections to this approach | p. 16 |
| The bearers of intrinsic value | p. 20 |
| The bearers of value: Abstract objects | p. 20 |
| The bearers of value: Concrete particulars | p. 26 |
| Organic unities and the principle of universality | p. 32 |
| Examples of organic unities | p. 34 |
| The principle of universality | p. 40 |
| Higher goods and the myth of Tithonus | p. 48 |
| Higher goods | p. 48 |
| The principle of rank | p. 55 |
| Higher goods and Mill's distinction | p. 59 |
| Higher goods and the principle of summation | p. 61 |
| Pleasure and its intrinsic value | p. 67 |
| Sensory and nonsensory pleasure | p. 67 |
| Pleasure and displeasure in the good, bad, and neutral | p. 73 |
| True and false pleasures | p. 77 |
| Hedonism | p. 80 |
| The value of desire satisfaction | p. 84 |
| Consciousness, knowledge, and the consciousness thesis | p. 88 |
| The consciousness thesis and the value of nonsentient life | p. 93 |
| Beauty | p. 97 |
| Value pluralism and its problems | p. 99 |
| Naturalism, nonnaturalism, and warrant | |
| The distinctiveness of intrinsic value | p. 103 |
| The objects of ordinary ethical belief and knowledge | p. 103 |
| Nonnaturalism and traditional naturalism | p. 107 |
| The identity thesis and intentional criteria of identity | p. 112 |
| Constitutional naturalism | p. 118 |
| Ethical facts and the explanatory requirement | p. 125 |
| Naturalism and analysis | p. 129 |
| Intrinsic value and modest a priori justification | p. 134 |
| Preliminary remarks and assumptions | p. 134 |
| A strong conception of a priori knowledge | p. 139 |
| Modest a priori knowledge and justification | p. 144 |
| The concept of an intrinsically acceptable proposition | p. 152 |
| Coherence and experience | p. 161 |
| Coherence theories | p. 161 |
| The regress argument and the doxastic ascent argument | p. 163 |
| Some objections to coherence theories | p. 173 |
| Emotional and moral experience as reasons for belief | p. 180 |
| Mere emotions as a reason for value beliefs | p. 191 |
| Appendix A: Chisholm's definition of organic unity | p. 196 |
| Appendix B: Some naturalistic analyses | p. 201 |
| Selected bibliography | p. 208 |
| Index | p. 213 |
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