In his Foreword, Professor Jones writes 'Mr Collier takes the opportunity to review the contributions of all forms of Intelligence, and the use and misuse that was made of them, in all the major phases of World War II. His task has required very wide reading of the great volume of original documents and derivative literature now available, and I admire the judgement that is evident throughout the book. Within the limits of treating the widest aspects of Intelligence in World War II in a small compass, Mr Collier has told the whole truth, fortunately without it turning out to be very unfavorable; and in the lessons to be drawn from it we indeed have one element of security if properly applied'.Basil Collier throws fresh light on the low priority given to Intelligence between the wars; the tendency of ministers and senior officials to rely less on intelligence reports than their own individual hunches; the failure to foresee the invasion of Norway; why, even with the aid of Enigma it was impossible to turn the scales in Crete, and why the Americans, though privy to some of Japans most closely guarded secrets, allowed the Pearl Harbor attack to take them by surprise.
