| Acknowledgements | p. xii |
| Introduction - The Problem of Moral Status | p. 1 |
| Moral Ontologies: From Individual to Relational Dogmas | |
| Individual Properties | p. 13 |
| Moral status as property | p. 13 |
| Individuals and their contract | p. 16 |
| First attempts to solve problems: change unit of analysis and expand social contract | p. 20 |
| Appearance and Virtue | p. 24 |
| Appearance and the social life: a turn to the phenomena | p. 24 |
| Virtue | p. 26 |
| Community | p. 33 |
| Relations: Communitarian and Metaphysical | p. 36 |
| Objections to communitarianism and collectivism | p. 37 |
| Combining properties with relations? | p. 40 |
| Towards a phenomenological argument | p. 43 |
| Relations: Natural and Social | p. 47 |
| Ecology and ecophilosophy: natural relations and the biotic community | p. 47 |
| Benton's Marxism: social relations and natural relations | p. 51 |
| Relations: Hybrid and Environmental | p. 58 |
| Latour's amodernism: the collective of hybrids | p. 58 |
| Ingold's ecological anthropology: dwelling and skill | p. 63 |
| Conclusion to Part I: Diogenes's Challenge | p. 70 |
| Moral Status Ascription and Its Conditions of Possibility: A Transcendental Argument | |
| Words and Sentences: Forms of Language Use | p. 75 |
| Words, meaning and the construction of moral status | p. 77 |
| Moral grammar a la Searle: moral status functions and the moral-linguistic contract | p. 82 |
| Living language: towards a critique of moral status ascription | p. 88 |
| Societies and Cultures (1): Forms of Living Together | p. 92 |
| Moral status, habitus and know-how | p. 92 |
| Heidegger's transcendental approach: being-in-the-world and dwelling | p. 95 |
| Moral status as given in a Mitwelt | p. 106 |
| Societies and Cultures (2): Forms of Life | p. 116 |
| Moral status as given in a form of life: using Wittgenstein | p. 116 |
| The cultural-social interpretation | p. 120 |
| The biological-material interpretation | p. 125 |
| Conclusion: Wittgenstein's transcendental argument | p. 133 |
| Bodies and Things: Forms of Feeling and Making | p. 139 |
| Human-animal relations: social and material-technological conditions | p. 140 |
| Moral status and the body: Merleau-Ponty and embodied cognition | p. 143 |
| Moral status and technology: beyond Marx | p. 147 |
| Using Ingold's metaphors: making, growing, revealing | p. 149 |
| The fiction of the automaton, human and non-human | p. 152 |
| Nature, virtue and skill | p. 160 |
| Spirits and Gods: Forms of Religion | p. 166 |
| The secularization of moral status and the purification of religion | p. 166 |
| Two conceptions of religion: genealogical spirituality and life-spirituality | p. 170 |
| Forms of spirit and moral status ascription | p. 173 |
| Shopping in the spiritual supermarket? | p. 177 |
| Fences, Walls and Maps: Forms of Historical Space | p. 179 |
| Two conceptions of space and time | p. 179 |
| Cultures and space | p. 180 |
| The city, the countryside and the wild | p. 185 |
| Space morality | p. 189 |
| Moral Metamorphosis: Concluding the Transcendental Argument | p. 194 |
| Living value: moral status ascription and forms of life | p. 194 |
| Can we move beyond modern and postmodern thinking? Towards living philosophy | p. 199 |
| Three imperatives for the art of living | p. 205 |
| General Conclusion | p. 207 |
| A different moral epistemology: painting, breathing, living | p. 207 |
| Morality's womb | p. 211 |
| Notes | p. 215 |
| References | p. 219 |
| Index | p. 225 |
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