Gallipoli : The Fatal Shore

Lieutenant-Colonel Weir saw it all as soon as he hit the beach – the disorientation and confusion. The Anzacs had not been landed in their intended formation, but debates still rage today about whether or not they were landed at the wrong spot – Anzac Cove, instead of a kilometre or so to the south. 'Wrong spot' can mean 'the unintended or misplaced spot' or it can mean 'the most inappropriate and unsuitable spot'. As to Anzac Cove being the 'unintended spot', we cannot be sure that there was no late change to move the landing there because no full record, original document or official account associated with final naval or landing force orders for 24 and 25 April 1915 exists. The original explanation given by Charles Bean of a sudden and mysterious northerly current drifting the landing boats off course can be rejected. Midshipman William Sheffield-Williamson, a naval veteran of the landing, recalled: 'No currents. It was a nice quiet morning, nothing much of a breeze, not enough to even sway the boats'. And Hamilton himself is on record as stating: 'Birdwood had no current to trouble him'. The current theory should be sunk forever and other explanations for the deviations of the tows be substituted. The search for explanations has produced what Gallipoli historians have called the riddles of the landing.

One explanation, using recent evidence, suggests that en route to shore the naval officers in charge of the tows made two deviations to the north, each probably of 22.5 degrees. The result was to bring them into range of Anzac Cove rather than Brighton Beach. There had to be a motive behind this change of direction. One suggestion has been that the officer in charge of steering the 9th Battalion's tows was confused in the darkness by features on shore that he was using to steer by and began the deviation. Another possibility involves a second theory that a late change of plan to relocate the landing further north to Anzac Cove took place and that the deviation was part of this plan. Changes to plans were frequently made, sometimes at the last minute – as in fact, with the landing time at Cape Helles. At 4.20 p.m. on 24 April the following signal concerning the Helles landing was sent to GHQ: 'From S.O.M.D.S.: Bombardment will commence at 5 a.m. instead of 5.15 a.m. Landing of troops will be at 5.30 a.m. instead of 6 a.m. Landing on Y Beach will take place at 5 a.m. instead of 5.30 a.m. It would not therefore have been surprising if last-minute changes had been made to the plan for the Anzac landing. High command had in fact already discussed some changes. Furthermore, the final stations taken up by the transports, as depicted by Bean in a sketch in his diary and in the official history, were in correct formation but due west of a position that favoured Anzac Cove not Brighton Beach.

Aerial reconnaissance undertaken on 13 April suggests a prime motive for relocation. It showed that Brighton Beach was wide open to Turkish artillery with seven guns placed on the southern end on Kaba Tepe, others on ridges to the northeast, and heavy long-range guns further to the southeast. It was well entrenched with a sizeable force and had barbed-wire entanglements in the water and on the beach. It was therefore the worst possible spot for landing thousands of men and equipment. Anzac Cove and its hinterland, however, was completely sheltered from direct artillery fire and lightly defended by no more than 100 to 200 troops. Its narrow expanse and precipitous slopes prompted the Turks to discount it as a likely landing spot, and they had made no elaborate arrangements for its defence.

The need for surprise – the reason for landing in the dark – and thereby secrecy would explain why few participants would be aware of any changes. Most of the men, having been briefed about Brighton Beach and its surrounds, and ignorant of any change of plan, naturally assumed, on landing at Anzac Cove with its different conditions, that they had been landed at the wrong spot. Those who needed to know of the changes would have been sworn to secrecy and the later they knew the more effective the plan would be. If this were the case, such individuals maintained the secret to their graves, only circumstantial evidence supporting the theory of a changed landing location.

Birdwood, as responsible commander, was to be contradictory in his statements on the subject, further adding to the enigma. Bad steering and change of location aside, the important point overall is that landing out of formation, not the fact of landing in Anzac Cove itself, caused much of the intitial confusion and delay. Had the tows stayed in their intended formation, they would have landed correctly spaced in Anzac Cove and in the intended order – from south to north, the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions – instead of haphazardly bunched around and to the south of Ariburnu. This turned out to be the main cause for the confusion and not Anzac Cove itself, which afforded considerable advantages.