Fixing Democracy

"Corrales's theory of power asymmetry resonates with the Latin American experience: constitutions are pacts, and their viability and content depend on the initial balance of forces between the president and the opposition. This book is central to emerging debates about the endogenous nature of institutional design." -Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, University of Notre Dame "Javier Corrales's Fixing Democracy is an important theoretical and empirical contribution to the study of constitutionalism, presidentialism, democratization and Latin American politics. Corrales argues that power-diffusing constitutions are an asset for democracies and that they are most likely to emerge when there is a relative symmetry of power between incumbents and the opposition. Constitutions that give presidents great powers can pave the way to democratic erosions; they are most likely when presidents have much more power than oppositions." -Scott Mainwaring, Harvard University "Fixing Democracy is an outstanding book on how the constitutional authority of Latin American presidents expands or is constrained, with major implications for the stability of democratic regimes and the troubling tendency for illiberal backsliding. The book speaks to a large literature on the effects of presidential constitutions in Latin America, but goes well beyond it by showing how constitutions themselves are shaped. Corrales's book is a model of theoretical sophistication and mixed-method empirical research. It will have an important impact on how we think about the challenges facing democracy in Latin America and, potentially, other regions as well." - Robert Kaufman, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University "This book is an important contribution to the field of neo-institutionalism in comparative politics. It fills a gap in knowledge of the reasons why presidential powers expand or contract in the context of the broader strength of democracy." -- L. M. Barnett, Our Lady of the Lake University, CHOICE