First Minds: Caterpillars, 'Karyotes, and Consciousness presents a novel theory of the origins of mind and consciousness dubbed the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC). It argues that sentience emerged with life itself. The most primitive unicellular species of bacteria are conscious, though it is a sentience of a primitive kind. They have minds, though they are tiny and limited in scope. Hints that cells might be conscious can be found in the writings of a few cell biologists but a fully developed theory has never been put forward before.
Other approaches to the origins of consciousness are examined and shown to be seriously or fatally flawed, specifically approaches based on: (a) the assumption that minds are computational and can be captured by an Artificial Intelligence, (b) efforts to discover the neuro-correlates of mental experiences and, (c) looking for consciousness in less complex species by identifying those that have precursors of those neuro-correlates. Reber shows how each of these approaches is shown to be either essentially impossible (the AI models) or so burdened by philosophical and empirical difficulties that they are effectively unworkable.
The CBC approach is developed using standard models of evolutionary biology. The remarkable repertoire of single-celled species that micro- and cell-biologists have discovered is reviewed. Bacteria, for example, have sophisticated sensory and perceptual systems, learn, form memories, make decisions based on information about their environment relative to internal metabolic states, communicate with each other, and even show a primitive form of altruism. All such functions are indicators of sentience.
Finally, the implications of the CBC model are discussed along with a number of related issues in evolutionary biology, philosophy of mind, the possibility of sentient plants, the ethical repercussions of universal animal sentience, and the long-range impact of adopting the CBC stance.
Industry Reviews
"In The First Minds, Reber masterfully organizes and presents this challenging theory in book form, which introduces readers to his reasons for positing the early origin of consciousness. He begins with the question of whether robots can be conscious, contrasting weak AI with strong AI and concluding that computers will not have minds because they do not have self-awareness and agency. He then gives a historical review of the resistance to Donald
Griffin's ideas of animal awareness and Brian Key's rejection of fish pain, offering a few approaches to his viewpoint. This is a well-constructed book, worth reading even for those who do not believe the premise."
-- Choice
"Nobody knows where consciousness comes from. Did it spring sui generis in the already complex brain of a hominid? Or did it evolve progressively from a simple form of awareness, already present in primitive organisms? Arthur Reber's engaging The First Minds argues for the latter: making a logical and erudite case for a cellular basis of consciousness. His style is wry and personable and readers will find his controversial thesis surprisingly plausible
and thought-provoking."
--Dennis Bray, Professor Emeritus, Cambridge University
"It is not necessary to agree with all the ideas advanced in Reber's new book to recognize it as a major contribution to the study of consciousness and to recommend it with enthusiasm to anyone interested in understanding how humans came to be conscious."
--Antonio Damasio, David Dornsife Professor of Neuroscience, Psychology and Philosophy, University of Southern California
"This is one of the most important books published on the origin of minds. The Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) Theory is the basis of this excellent book and provides the very first bottom-up evolutionary explanation for the emergence of mind in living systems. The CBC has profound implications for the so-called Hard Problem of consciousness, as well as for all Artificial Intelligence models. This book will change both philosophy and biology, with
relevant implications also for physics."
-- Franti%sek Balu%ska, Institute of Cellular and Molecular Biology, University of Bonn, Germany
"Few people over the last twenty-five years have spent more time thinking about the problems of consciousness than Arthur Reber. Nor has anyone offered a more original, more philosophically sophisticated, or more scientifically-informed treatment of those problems than Reber does in The First Minds. Reber's is a liberal theory. His Cellular Basis of Consciousness works from the bottom up, starting with the small and with the (comparatively) simple.
That not only squares with the theory of biological evolution by means of natural selection, it also ensures that many of the towering problems about how human brains instantiate consciousness are basically
defanged by the time The First Minds has worked its way up to them. Reber's theory crosses the Rubicon of consciousness at its headwaters, where it is but a trickle, instead of waiting to cross it, as other approaches to consciousness do, where that river is deep and wide and treacherous.
The hard work for Reber comes with delineating the form of consciousness to be attributed to the likes of single celled organisms and plants--tasks he undertakes with daring and insight that is informed by recent biological research. Wonderfully written from beginning to end, The First Minds is going to become one of the first books to which future inquirers about consciousness should go, especially if they care at all about the relevant science."
--Robert N. McCauley, author of Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not and William Rand Kenan Jr. University Professor of Philosophy at the Center for Mind, Brain, and Culture of Emory University
"This remarkable, well-written and thought-provoking book challenges conventional thinking in proposing a radical theory of consciousness that considers all members of the animal kingdom, even unicellular bacteria, to possess a form of consciousness. The author draws upon an impressive knowledge of philosophy, evolutionary biology and psychology in support of his theory, and in a well-reasoned yet very entertaining manner, demonstrates that in many ways it is
not so radical at all." --James Alcock, Professor of Psychology, York University
