| Preface | |
| Acknowledgments | |
| Overview | p. 3 |
| The Division of Common Property | p. 3 |
| Micro vs. Macro Justice | p. 6 |
| The Terms of Discussion | p. 7 |
| Normative Theories of Justice: Aristotle, Bentham, and Rawls | p. 9 |
| No Envy | p. 11 |
| Distributive Judgments and Interpersonal Comparisons | p. 12 |
| Why Classical Formulas Fail | p. 13 |
| The Priority Principle | p. 14 |
| The Consistency Principle | p. 15 |
| When Proportionality Fails for Divisible Goods | p. 16 |
| Games of Fair Division | p. 17 |
| Equity and Efficiency | p. 19 |
| Equity and Priority | p. 20 |
| Methods for Distributing Indivisible Goods | p. 20 |
| The Demobilization of U.S. Soldiers at the End of World War II | p. 23 |
| The Point System for Allocating Kidneys in the United States | p. 27 |
| General Principles | p. 31 |
| Point Systems | p. 34 |
| Participatory Equity | p. 35 |
| Equity as Near as May Be | p. 42 |
| The Apportionment of Indivisible Goods | p. 42 |
| Apportionment in the United States | p. 43 |
| Statement of the Problem | p. 44 |
| The Methods of Hamilton and Jefferson | p. 45 |
| The Bias of Jefferson's Method | p. 46 |
| The Methods of Daniel Webster and John Quincy Adams | p. 48 |
| The Standard Two-State Solution and Its Generalization | p. 49 |
| The Alabama Paradox | p. 50 |
| The Method of Joseph Hill | p. 52 |
| Bias | p. 54 |
| Consistency and Priority | p. 57 |
| Staying within the Quota | p. 60 |
| The Population Paradox | p. 60 |
| Equity, Equality, Proportionality | p. 64 |
| Aristotle's Equity Principle | p. 64 |
| Claims Problems | p. 66 |
| The Contested Garment Rule | p. 67 |
| The Shapley Value | p. 69 |
| An Inconsistency in the Shapley Value | p. 71 |
| Maimonides' Rule | p. 73 |
| Gain vs. Loss | p. 73 |
| Varieties of Equality | p. 75 |
| Equity, Priority, and Consistency | p. 76 |
| Incentive Effects | p. 79 |
| Cost Sharing | p. 81 |
| Sharing Gains from Cooperation | p. 81 |
| A Cost-Sharing Problem between Two Towns | p. 81 |
| A Cost-Sharing Problem among Three Towns | p. 82 |
| The Cooperative Game Model | p. 85 |
| The Tennessee Valley Authority | p. 86 |
| The Decomposition Principle | p. 88 |
| The Shapley Value | p. 90 |
| Equitable Core Solutions: The Nucleolus | p. 93 |
| Progressive Taxation | p. 97 |
| Historical Background | p. 97 |
| The Progressivity Principle | p. 98 |
| The U.S. Federal Income Tax | p. 99 |
| Redressing Inequality | p. 100 |
| The Benefit Theory | p. 102 |
| Ability to Pay and Equal Sacrifice | p. 105 |
| The Effect of Progressive Taxation on Work Effort | p. 108 |
| Optimal Taxation | p. 109 |
| The Effect of Taxation on Risk-Taking | p. 111 |
| Fair Bargains | p. 116 |
| Bargaining Over Common Property | p. 116 |
| The Bargaining Set | p. 116 |
| The Coordination Problem | p. 118 |
| Classical Bargaining Solutions: Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky | p. 119 |
| Framing Effects | p. 122 |
| Equity Criteria Based on Tangible Claims | p. 123 |
| Experimental Results on Bargaining | p. 124 |
| Empirical Evidence from Sharecropping Practices | p. 127 |
| Fair Process | p. 130 |
| Games of Fair Division | p. 130 |
| Auctioning Indivisibles | p. 131 |
| Superior and Inferior Modes of Division | p. 134 |
| Divide and Choose | p. 135 |
| The Divider's Advantage | p. 137 |
| Removing the Divider's Advantage by Lottery | p. 138 |
| Successively Splitting the Difference: The Raiffa Solution | p. 140 |
| Alternating Offers: The Nash Solution | p. 141 |
| Bidding to Be Divider: The Egalitarian Solution | p. 143 |
| Equity, Envy, and Efficiency | p. 146 |
| Fair and Efficient Exchange | p. 146 |
| Transparent Inequity | p. 146 |
| Egalitarianism | p. 147 |
| A Difficulty with Egalitarianism | p. 150 |
| Competitive Allocations | p. 151 |
| The Equity of Competitive Allocation | p. 152 |
| The Competitive Standard of Comparison | p. 154 |
| Enlarging the Pie | p. 155 |
| An Application: Assigning Students to Dormitories | p. 156 |
| Restricting the Domain of Exchange | p. 160 |
| Conclusion | p. 162 |
| Appendix: The Mathematical Theory of Equity | p. 169 |
| Two Fundamental Principles | p. 169 |
| Zero-One Allocations | p. 174 |
| Opinion Aggregation | p. 176 |
| Integer Allocation | p. 184 |
| Claims and Liabilities | p. 190 |
| Cooperative Games | p. 199 |
| Bargaining | p. 205 |
| Multiple Goods | p. 212 |
| Bibliographical Notes | p. 219 |
| Bibliography | p. 223 |
| Index | p. 233 |
| Table of Contents provided by Blackwell. All Rights Reserved. |
