| Preface | p. xi |
| Subtle Complexity of Social Choice | p. 1 |
| Does Everything Go Wrong? | p. 1 |
| And the Proud Father Is... | p. 3 |
| Enemies? | p. 7 |
| Curse of Dimensionality | p. 13 |
| Outline | p. 15 |
| Dethroning Dictators, and Then Paradoxes | p. 16 |
| The "Will of the Voters": What Is It? | p. 18 |
| Dethroning Dictators | p. 20 |
| Major Negative Conclusions | p. 21 |
| Arrow's Theorem | p. 21 |
| Sen's Seminal Result | p. 23 |
| Topological Dictators | p. 26 |
| "Paradox of Voting" and Condorcet's Triplets | p. 28 |
| List's Lists | p. 29 |
| Anscombe | p. 30 |
| A Standard Requirement | p. 31 |
| Commonality | p. 31 |
| Condorcet's Ideas Dominate | p. 32 |
| Can We Trust the Majority Voting over Pairs? | p. 40 |
| A Common Explanation | p. 42 |
| Why Do These Negative Results Occur? | p. 43 |
| Arrow's Theorem | p. 44 |
| Sen's Result | p. 47 |
| Topological Dictators and Beach Parties | p. 51 |
| Positive Replacements | p. 58 |
| Arrow's Result | p. 58 |
| Sen's Result | p. 64 |
| Topological Dictators and More Effective Agents | p. 70 |
| Final Thoughts | p. 72 |
| Voting Dictionaries | p. 74 |
| What Goes Wrong? | p. 76 |
| Axiomatic Approach versus Paradoxes | p. 77 |
| Dictionaries | p. 77 |
| Aggregation Rules | p. 80 |
| Lassie and the Axiomatic Approach | p. 81 |
| Dictionaries | p. 84 |
| A Little Chaos | p. 86 |
| Chaos within Voting Theory | p. 90 |
| Dictionary Listings for Positional Rules | p. 91 |
| Using the Dictionaries | p. 96 |
| Variety Coming from Varieties | p. 99 |
| Other Dictionaries | p. 104 |
| Comparing Outcomes over a Set of Candidates | p. 107 |
| General Results | p. 107 |
| Let Elementary Geometry Do the Work | p. 109 |
| Procedure Lines | p. 111 |
| Other Rules, Such As Approval Voting | p. 113 |
| A Working Tool for Actual Elections | p. 116 |
| Back to the Original Problem: Creating Examples | p. 118 |
| Explaining All Voting Paradoxes | p. 123 |
| Profile Coordinates | p. 124 |
| Coffee Reflections | p. 124 |
| The "Water" for Voting Rules | p. 127 |
| Nothing Goes Wrong | p. 133 |
| A Creamy Addition: Positional Differences | p. 139 |
| Anything Can Happen | p. 144 |
| Sugar and Spice, and All Those Nice Cycles | p. 146 |
| Differences between Borda and Condorcet | p. 157 |
| Kemeny, Dodgson, and Other Systems; Who Cares? | p. 158 |
| All Possible Three-Candidate Outcomes | p. 160 |
| Creating Examples | p. 161 |
| Converting Molecules into Coffee, Sugar, and Cream Coordinates | p. 162 |
| The Will of the Voters | p. 165 |
| Selecting Conditions | p. 166 |
| Identifying the Voters' Wishes | p. 168 |
| Extensions and Questions | p. 170 |
| Teaser about More Candidates | p. 170 |
| Designing Profile Configurations | p. 171 |
| An Interesting Relationship | p. 172 |
| A New Approach | p. 175 |
| Finding and Proving New Theorems | p. 178 |
| Special Case; Three Candidates | p. 180 |
| Condorcet Winners and Losers | p. 180 |
| Borda Winners and Losers | p. 181 |
| Low-Hanging Fruit with n Candidates | p. 182 |
| Borda versus Pairwise Rankings | p. 183 |
| Borda versus Borda Rankings | p. 187 |
| Deliver Us from the Plurality Vote | p. 190 |
| Our Standard Voting Rule | p. 190 |
| The 2000 U.S. Presidential Election | p. 191 |
| The 2002 French Presidential Election | p. 192 |
| Reform, or Fighting Termites with Paint and Putty? | p. 195 |
| Resolutions, but Other Problems | p. 197 |
| Newton's Third Law of Politics | p. 198 |
| Comparison with Pairwise Voting | p. 200 |
| Stability and the Core | p. 202 |
| McKelvey's Chaos Theorem | p. 206 |
| Generic Stability of the Core | p. 208 |
| More about Cycles and Chaos | p. 211 |
| Condorcet n-Cycles | p. 212 |
| Controlling Chaos | p. 213 |
| Final Comments | p. 214 |
| Appendix: Extending the Upset Child Example | p. 218 |
| Source of the Problem | p. 219 |
| Generalizations | p. 222 |
| Level Sets | p. 226 |
| References | p. 231 |
| Index | p. 237 |
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