| Acknowledgements | p. ix |
| Arguments Concerning Constructive Empiricism | p. 1 |
| The aim of science | p. 1 |
| The constructive empiricist and his critics | p. 6 |
| A taxonomy of objections | p. 6 |
| Observation and detection | p. 9 |
| Extra terrestrials and extra-terrestrials | p. 14 |
| The new epistemology | p. 20 |
| The English and Prussian models of rationality | p. 20 |
| Relativism, scepticism and voluntarism | p. 23 |
| Summary | p. 27 |
| Epistemic Voluntarism: Rationality, Inference and Empiricism | p. 30 |
| Motivating voluntarism | p. 30 |
| Diachronic coherence and the principle of reflection | p. 34 |
| The diachronic Dutch-book | p. 34 |
| From Dutch-books to cognitive calibration | p. 37 |
| Greek sailors, drunk drivers and other epistemic villains | p. 41 |
| Judgements about commitments | p. 46 |
| Traditional epistemology: False hopes and bad lots | p. 49 |
| The justification of induction | p. 49 |
| Reliabilism and scepticism | p. 53 |
| The 'best of a bad lot' | p. 58 |
| Background theories and the ranking of hypotheses | p. 65 |
| Probabilistic and non-probabilistic inferences | p. 67 |
| Taking a stance | p. 72 |
| The empiricist dilemma | p. 72 |
| Rationality and relativism | p. 78 |
| Summary | p. 84 |
| Against Epistemic Voluntarism: Musgrave, Modality and Mathematics | p. 87 |
| The problem(s) of internal coherence | p. 87 |
| Musgrave's objection revisited | p. 90 |
| The unobservability of unobservables | p. 90 |
| On the syntax and semantics of observability | p. 93 |
| A question of scope | p. 96 |
| Ladyman's dilemma: Counterfactuals, contexts and conventions | p. 98 |
| The problem of modality | p. 98 |
| From modal realism to structural realism | p. 100 |
| Deflationism and voluntarism about modality | p. 105 |
| Constructive empiricism and mathematical nominalism | p. 112 |
| Abstract mathematical objects | p. 112 |
| Constructive empiricism and mathematical fictionalism | p. 117 |
| Primitive consistency and expressive completeness | p. 124 |
| The vices of voluntarism | p. 131 |
| Summary | p. 133 |
| Appendix-An expanded modal language | p. 136 |
| On the Nature and Norms of Acceptance and Belief | p. 144 |
| Another perspective on scientific attitudes | p. 144 |
| Deciding to accept, deciding to believe | p. 148 |
| A lot of fuss about functionalism | p. 148 |
| The individuation of intentional states | p. 157 |
| Contradiction and science | p. 167 |
| Empiricism and agnosticism | p. 179 |
| The acceptance solution | p. 179 |
| Committed modal agnosticism | p. 185 |
| Acceptance and anti-realism in the philosophy of modality | p. 193 |
| A short note on mathematical nominalism | p. 208 |
| Summary | p. 210 |
| Conclusion: What Is This Thing Called 'Constructive Empiricism'? | p. 212 |
| Notes | p. 216 |
| References | p. 225 |
| Index | p. 233 |
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