| Testing Collective Action Theory | p. 1 |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Three Sources for Tests | p. 4 |
| Varieties of Empirical Evidence | p. 5 |
| A Retreat to the Mundane | p. 6 |
| The Plan of the Book | p. 7 |
| Bibliography | p. 8 |
| Leadership and Mobilization | p. 11 |
| Introduction | p. 11 |
| The Role of Leadership in Mobilization | p. 13 |
| Events as Catalysts in Mobilization | p. 16 |
| Does the Form of Government Matter? | p. 19 |
| Resources | p. 20 |
| Clandestine Mobilization | p. 22 |
| Mass Mobilization | p. 23 |
| When Leaders Have Incomplete Knowledge | p. 24 |
| Coordination Power | p. 25 |
| When Leaders are Replenished | p. 26 |
| Competing Leaders | p. 27 |
| Recruiting Violent Dissidents | p. 28 |
| Civil War | p. 29 |
| Pecuniary Incentives | p. 30 |
| After the Massacre | p. 32 |
| Leadership and Mobilization | p. 32 |
| Bibliography | p. 33 |
| Tactical Adaptation and Symbolic Protest | p. 37 |
| Introduction | p. 37 |
| Definitions and the Challenge of Analysis | p. 38 |
| Adaptation and Symbolic Protest in Autocratic States | p. 41 |
| Symbolic Protest in Repressive Systems | p. 45 |
| Adaptation, Innovation, and Diffusion in Democratic States | p. 47 |
| The Challenge of Publicity and Media Attention | p. 47 |
| Clothing or its Absence | p. 47 |
| Music | p. 48 |
| Bricks, Mortar, and Cement | p. 49 |
| Symbolic Action | p. 49 |
| Fake Signs | p. 50 |
| Two-sided Adaptation and Coevolution | p. 51 |
| Adaptation and Symbolic Protest: A Research Agenda | p. 53 |
| Bibliography | p. 54 |
| Dimensions of Space and Time in Protest and Repression | p. 57 |
| Introduction | p. 57 |
| Space in Theory and Evidence | p. 58 |
| Dissident Entrepreneurs Select and Use Space Based on Their Tactics | p. 58 |
| Dissident Entrepreneurs Seek to Shift Protesters into a Space that Reduces the Probability of Coercion and Maximizes Mobilization | p. 61 |
| Protester Site Selection | p. 62 |
| Tacit Coordination and Site Selection | p. 63 |
| Dissidents Adapt Not Only Tactically But Also Spatially When Faced with Large Coercion Forces | p. 64 |
| The State's Dilemma Grows Larger as Dissident Mobilization Diffuses and Concentration Increases | p. 65 |
| Space in Protest and Repression | p. 70 |
| Time | p. 71 |
| Dictatorships and Rapid Collapse | p. 72 |
| The Special Case of Riots | p. 74 |
| Duration of Protest Under Heavy Repression | p. 75 |
| The Duration and Timing of Protest Events | p. 78 |
| Stability Over Time | p. 80 |
| Specification Problems and the Duration of Protest and Repression | p. 80 |
| Bibliography | p. 81 |
| Terror | p. 83 |
| Introduction | p. 83 |
| Why Do Terror Groups Form? | p. 84 |
| Necessary Supports of a Terror Group | p. 86 |
| Financing Terror | p. 86 |
| Recruitment | p. 90 |
| Safe Areas, Safe Houses, and Protective Support | p. 92 |
| Leadership | p. 93 |
| Methods of Combating a Terror Group | p. 94 |
| Arrests, Killings, and Forces Against Terror | p. 95 |
| "Critical Mass" in the Context of Terror | p. 98 |
| Political Arms, Negotiations, Cease-Fires, and Splintering | p. 99 |
| Loss of Popular Support | p. 100 |
| Extinct and Zombie Terror Organizations | p. 101 |
| The Possibility of Eliminating an International Terror Organization | p. 101 |
| Bibliography | p. 102 |
| Evidence for Collective Action Theory | p. 105 |
| Introduction | p. 105 |
| Evaluation | p. 106 |
| Wintrobe | p. 106 |
| DeNardo | p. 106 |
| Lichbach | p. 108 |
| Theory in the Light of Empirical Evidence | p. 108 |
| Leadership and Mobilization | p. 109 |
| Tactical Adaptation and Symbolic Protest | p. 110 |
| Dimensions of Space and Time | p. 110 |
| Terror | p. 111 |
| Collective Action Theory and Empirical Evidence | p. 112 |
| Bibliography | p. 112 |
| Index | p. 113 |
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