Throughout US history, presidents have had vastly different reactions to naval incidents. Though some incidents have been resolved diplomatically, others have escalated to outright war. What factors influence the outcome of a naval incident, especially when calls for retribution mingle with recommendations for restraint? Given the rise of long range anti-ship and anti-air missile systems, coupled with tensions in East Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Black and Baltic Seas, the question is more relevant than ever for US naval diplomacy.
In Choosing War, Douglas Carl Peifer compares the ways in which different presidential administrations have responded when American lives were lost at sea. He examines in depth three cases: the Maine incident (1898), which led to war in the short term; the Lusitania crisis (1915), which set the trajectory for intervention; and the Panay incident (1937), which was settled diplomatically. While evaluating Presidents William McKinley, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt's responses to these incidents, Peifer lucidly reflects on the options they had available and the policies they ultimately selected. The case studies illuminate how leadership, memory, and shifting domestic policy shape presidential decisions, providing significant insights into the connections between naval incidents, war, and their historical contexts. Rich in dramatic narrative and historical perspective, Choosing War offers an essential tool for confronting future naval crises.
Industry Reviews
"This work is very valuable to aspiring historians in its discussion of the uses of history....With at-sea incidents between U.S. and Iranian and Chinese ships on the rise, this book should be required reading for policymakers and national security professionals alike."--Robert M. Brown, Military Review
"[A]n excellent example of how historically informed comparative analysis can create a framework for our understanding of the uses of force and war-making....The gripping prose style and narrative detail in each episode are impressive....[O]ne can only hope--likely in vain--that current policymakers will read this excellent study."--Stephen R. Ortiz, Passport
"[T]his book could appeal to someone who knows little about the three naval incidents and wants to get a relatively quick lesson on the historical background and the military and political considerations of each. It should also appeal to the enthusiast who really wants to get into the weeds of diplomacy with Peifer."--Dave Page, The Journal of America's Military Past
"Peifer's insightful analysis in Choosing War is as useful as it is timely....Peifer makes a unique contribution to our understanding of how an American administration makes that most important of decisions--whether or not to go to war. Students of diplomatic, naval, and military history and those interested in the national security decision-making process will find Choosing War a valuable endeavor and a worthwhile addition to their
professional libraries. Well researched and with extensive notes, Choosing War hits the mark."--Mark Montesclaros, H-War
"Choosing War is an excellent dissection of the decisions made by American presidents in the wake of the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay incidents. Choosing War, in great detail, shows that naval incidents are very often a precursor to greater conflicts on land, on sea, and in the air....It is a unique book that is written clearly enough to serve as popular history, yet Choosing War will also serve as a great reference
to American military figures, geopolitical strategists, and their publicly elected leaders."--Larry Provost, MCU Journal
"Well-reasoned and convincing, Choosing War makes an important contribution to the fields of presidential studies and decision making. It also provides excellent examinations of three naval events and their link to foreign relations. Thus it will be of interest and value to both diplomatic and naval historians. There exists no similar study."--James C. Bradford, Texas A&M University, editor of America, Sea Power, and the World
"Americans can choose their wars, or blunder into them. Douglas Peifer's insights into three moments of crisis and decision from the high seas--the Maine, the Lusitania, and the Panay--eloquently explain the difference. A must-read for anyone interested in naval history, or in how the most difficult decisions that cross a president's desk often come from unexpected times and places."--Jeffrey A. Engel, Director, Center for
Presidential History, Southern Methodist University
"Presidents from Dwight Eisenhower to poor Barack Obama today have luxuriated in the certainty that we could project American force anywhere to solve any conflict that collided with our national interests. Mr. Peifer argues naval and air power no longer are adequate shortcuts to diplomacy."--Washington Times
"A compelling illustration of the sort of insights that political scientists and practitioners routinely miss...Peifer's wonderfully clear prose makes the volume a page-turner."--H-Net, H-Diplo
"[An] exemplary feat of historical interpretation."--Naval Historical Foundation
"This is a valuable work...[Choosing War] is worth a place on the reader's list and is highly recommended."--Northern Mariner
"In Choosing War, historian Douglas Carl Peifer has written a book that can help tomorrow's policymakers anticipate the kinds of predicaments that may confront them...Anyone interested in improving critical thinking during future maritime emergencies will find Choosing War to be provocative [and] rewarding."--Michigan War Studies Review
"Articulate, well organized, and highly readable... Peifer makes a unique contribution to our understanding of how an American administration makes that most important of decisions-whether or not to go to war... Choosing War hits the mark."--H-Net, H-War
"Choosing War, in great detail, shows that naval incidents are very often a precursor to
greater conflicts on land, on sea, and in the air. Douglas Carl Peifer also reaffirms a need for the historical perspective, short and long term, in regard to contemporary matters. These contemporary matters are often thought to be the exclusive domain of political scientists and policy analysts, but Choosing War shows that historians can add just as much, if not more, to current policy debates."--Marine Corps University Journal
