Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

Sir Julian Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy represents the most refined general statement of the uses of naval power in wartime as the subject was understood at the beginning of the twentieth century. Corbett, inspired by read­ing Clausewitz's On War, applied a general, philosophical approach to the specific issues of naval conflict. Using his extensive knowledge of naval history, Corbett was able to refine some of the ideas developed earlier by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Phillip Colomb. Complementing those earlier writers' illumination of specific points, Corbett wrote what must be considered the first successful attempt at a compre­hensive synthesis of the subject, linking it both to the general theory of warfare and to the specific issues of sea power, strategy, and naval battle. Although he could not foresee the importance of the airplane, the submarine, and outer space to naval warfare, his work is seminal. Part III, in particular, is an early attempt to deal with what we have recently come to call "operational art." While Corbett never uses that term, his subject is the same: that area between strategy and tactics which translates strategic vision into successful activity of forces in space and time, constrained by logistics and the power and ambitions of the enemy.

The Classics of Sea Power series makes readily available, in uniform, authoritative editions, the key works of profes­sional naval thought. Illustrating naval development over the centuries, these major original, book-length works relating to theory, strategy, tactics, operations, and important themes in naval warfare have been chosen for their eloquence and time­liness. The series is a companion to histories, anthologies, and other interpretative writings, providing a depth of under­standing that cannot be had from reading secondary sources alone.