| Acknowledgments | p. xi |
| Introduction | p. 3 |
| Three Classic Controversies | |
| Putting Up with Heresy | p. 19 |
| Introduction | p. 19 |
| The Contractual Argument | p. 21 |
| The Epistemic Argument | p. 26 |
| The Pluralist Argument | p. 28 |
| Proast on Locke | p. 30 |
| Contractualism and Abstraction in Liberal Political Morality | p. 36 |
| Conclusion | p. 44 |
| Freedom for Eccentrics | p. 46 |
| Introduction | p. 46 |
| The Liberty Principle | p. 47 |
| Stephen on Mill | p. 61 |
| Stephen Examined | p. 66 |
| A Utilitarian Defence of Liberalism? | p. 71 |
| Conclusion | p. 74 |
| Is Prostitution Unpatriotic? | p. 76 |
| Introduction | p. 76 |
| Devlin's Disintegration Thesis | p. 79 |
| The Democratic Argument | p. 81 |
| Hart on Devlin | p. 83 |
| The Democratic Argument Considered | p. 87 |
| A Communitarian Reinterpretation of the Disintegration Thesis? | p. 89 |
| Conclusion | p. 93 |
| Liberalism Today | |
| Should Liberals Be Perfectionists? | p. 97 |
| Introduction | p. 97 |
| Well-Being and Personal Autonomy | p. 98 |
| Practical Reason, Value, and Authority | p. 109 |
| Moral Pluralism and the Harm Principle | p. 111 |
| Raz's Harm Principle Examined | p. 115 |
| Perfectionism and Politics | p. 131 |
| Conclusion | p. 134 |
| The Continuity Thesis | p. 136 |
| Introduction | p. 136 |
| The Challenge Model of Ethics | p. 138 |
| From Ethics to Politics | p. 142 |
| The Challenge Model Examined | p. 145 |
| Challenge and Equality of Resources | p. 145 |
| Challenge and Anti-paternalism | p. 148 |
| Challenge and Ethical Neutrality | p. 151 |
| Whom Is the Challenge Model For? | p. 152 |
| Desert Island Contractualism? The Auction and Neutrality | p. 154 |
| Conclusion | p. 161 |
| Contract Killing: A Critique | p. 162 |
| Introduction | p. 162 |
| The Reflexivity Thesis | p. 163 |
| Two Concepts of Reasonableness | p. 169 |
| Equality | p. 170 |
| Plurality | p. 171 |
| Abstraction | p. 172 |
| How to Defend Neutrality | p. 177 |
| Conclusion | p. 179 |
| Defending Liberal Neutrality | |
| Democratic Equality | p. 183 |
| Introduction | p. 183 |
| Moral Equality | p. 185 |
| Democracy | p. 190 |
| Democracy and Contractualism | p. 193 |
| Conclusion | p. 200 |
| Against the Epistemic Turn | p. 201 |
| Introduction | p. 201 |
| Society as a Fair System of Cooperation | p. 204 |
| The Social Contract: The Argument for the Original Position | p. 205 |
| The Social Contract: The Argument from the Original Position | p. 206 |
| Stability for the Right Reasons, and the Idea of a Well-Ordered Society | p. 208 |
| Reasonable Pluralism and Stability | p. 210 |
| Political Liberalism: Basic Ideas | p. 211 |
| The 'Reasonable' in Rawls | p. 214 |
| Scanlon's Contractualism | p. 222 |
| Conclusion | p. 224 |
| Beyond the Basic Structure | p. 226 |
| Introduction | p. 226 |
| The Argument Revisited | p. 228 |
| The Scope of Neutrality | p. 230 |
| Who or What Is to Be Neutral? | p. 231 |
| What Kind of State Neutrality, and Why? | p. 233 |
| Conclusion: The Place of Neutrality | p. 237 |
| How Political Is the Personal? | p. 239 |
| The Moral Division of Labour | p. 241 |
| The Socialist and Feminist Critiques | p. 243 |
| The Institutional Approach Defended | p. 247 |
| Three Ways That 'The Personal Is Political' | p. 249 |
| Applying Political Principles to the Personal: Three Sites and Modes | p. 252 |
| Three Different Types of Partiality | p. 255 |
| Justice and Economic Incentives | p. 257 |
| Justice and the Family | p. 259 |
| Familial Partiality | p. 259 |
| Justice and the Family | p. 262 |
| Conclusion | p. 265 |
| Notes | p. 273 |
| Bibliography | p. 327 |
| Index | p. 341 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
