Truth and Skepticism

Preface
Part 1: Rejecting Correspondence and All Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Minimal Requirements for an Adequate Theory of Truth
Chapter 3: Justification for Non-Vacuity and Reliability Principles
Chapter 4: The Core of Correspondence and Other Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth
Chapter 5: The Main Argument Against Correspondence and Other Non-Epistemic Theories of Truth
Chapter 6: How the Main Argument Differs From Other Similar Arguments
Chapter 7: Forestalling Three Predictable Objections to the Main Argument
Chapter 8: Does the Main Argument Confuse
Chapter 9: Does the Main Argument Require Abandoning Truth as a Goal?
Chapter 10: An Objection from Common Sense
Chapter 11: The Objection from the Paradox of Analysis
Chapter 12: A Proposed Reduction of the Main Argument
Part 2: In Defense of the Epistemic Theory of Truth
Chapter 1: Preliminary Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Truth
Chapter 2: Other Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Truth
Chapter 3: Conclusion
Part 3: Defeating Skepticism
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: The Moral of the Above Taxonomy
Chapter 3: Self-Defeating Skepticisms and the Strength of Global Weak Skepticism
Chapter 4: The Canonical Argument for Global Weak Skepticism and the Contextualist Response
Chapter 5: Other Critiques of Contextualism
Chapter 6: The Asymmetry Objection to the Argument from Ignorance
Chapter 7: Global Weak Skepticism as an Inference to the Best Explanation
Chapter 8: Is the Global Skepticism here Refuted Implied by the Main Argument?
Part 4:Conclusions
Chapter 1: The Main Problem and Future Prospects
Chapter 2: Blind realism and the Non-Vacuity Objection
Chapter 3: Does Blind Realism Presuppose Non-Epistemic Truth?
Chapter 4: The Fitch Objection
Bibliography
Index