Thought-Contents

Cover -- Contents -- Preface and acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part I: Preliminaries -- 1. Terms of the art -- 1.1. Some types of intentionality -- 1.2. The substitutional approach and its problems -- 1.3. Non-Actualism -- 1.4. Intensionality and extensionality -- 1.5. Hyper-intensionality -- 1.6. Opacity and transparency -- 1.7. De re / de dicto / de se -- 2. Adequacy conditions and failed theories -- 2.1. Some general adequacy conditions -- 2.2. Frege's theory of thoughts -- 2.3. Russell's propositional and multiple-relation theories -- 2.4. Chisholm's property-attribution theory -- Part II: Ontology -- 3. Logical forms and mental representations: The lesson of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement -- 3.1. Adequacy conditions on the reduction -- 3.2. The formalities of MRTJ -- 3.3. The theory ... -- 3.4. The bridge principles and reduction of MRTJ to ... -- 3.5. Vindication and the adequacy conditions -- 3.6. Implications of the reduction of MRTJ for our wider project -- 3.7. The shape of things to come -- 4. Thought-contents, senses, and the belief relation: The proto-theory -- 4.1. Overview -- 4.2. The underlying theory of abstract objects -- 4.3. The proto-theory -- 5. Thought-contents, senses, and the belief relation: The full theory -- 5.1. Revisions to the proto-theory -- 5.2. Application to higher-order belief -- 5.3. Generalizing key definitions, principles, and theorems -- 5.4. Doing without empty senses -- Appendix to Chapter 5: The formal theory -- Part III: Semantics -- 6. Belief reports and compositional semantics -- 6.1. The theory ... as a semantical metalanguage -- 6.2. The target language L1 -- 6.3. A ... based sense-reference semantics for L0 and L1 -- 6.4. Semantics for mentalese-or: speak for yourself! -- 6.5. Prospects for naturalization -- 7. Meeting the semantical adequacy conditions -- 7.1. De dicto / de re / de se -- 7.2. Iterated belief reports -- 7.3. A problem about reflexivity -- 7.4. Saul Kripke's original puzzle -- 7.5. Kripke's puzzle and iterated belief reports -- 7.6. David Austin's 'Two Tubes' puzzle -- 7.7. Pragmatics versus semantics -- 7.8. Mark Richard's puzzle -- 8. Objectives and replies -- 8.1. Specific objections to our semantical theory -- 8.2. Generic objections to 'Fregean' semantics -- Part IV: Rear-guard action -- 9. The case for object-dependent thoughts -- 9.1. The central theses -- 9.2. Gareth Evans' first argument for (ODT-1) -- 9.3. Critique and defense of Evans' first argument -- 9.4. Evans' second argument for (ODT-1) -- 9.5. Critique and defense of Evans' second argument -- 9.6. The problem of negative existentials involving empty singular terms --T.