Strategy

Part I: Representations and Basic Assumptions
2) The Extensive Form
3) Strategies and the Normal Form
4) Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs
5) General Assumptions and Methodology

Part II: Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings
6) Dominance and Best Response
7) Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance
8) Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest
9) Nash Equilibrium
10) Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting
11) Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
12) Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies
13) Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings

Part III: Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings
14) Details of the Extensive Form
15) Sequential Rationality and Solution Concepts
16) Topics in Industrial Organization
17) Parlor Games
18) Bargaining Problems
19) Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games
20) Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium
21) Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, And Ownership
22) Repeated Games and Reputation
23) Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill

Part IV: Information
24) Random Events and Incomplete Information
25) Risk and Incentives in Contracting
26) Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability
27) Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation
28) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
29) Job-Market Signaling and Reputation

Appendices
A) Review of Mathematics
B) The Mathematics of Rationalizability and Existence of Nash Equilibirum

Index