Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution

Acknowledgments Contributors 1: Peter A. Danielson: Introduction Rationality 2: Edward F. Mc Clennen: Rationality and Rules 3: David Gauthier: Intention and Deliberation 4: Michael E. Bratman: Following Through with One's Plans: Reply to David Gauthier 5: A. D. Irvine: How Breass' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem 6: Bryan R. Routledge: Economics of the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Background 7: Ronald de Sousa: Modeling Rationality: Normative or Descriptive? Modeling Social Interaction 8: Leslie Burkholder: Theorem 1 9: Louis Marinoff: The Failure of Success: Intrafamilial Exploitation in the Prisoner's Dilemma 10: Peter Kollock: Transforming Social Dilemmas: Group Identity and Co-Operation 11: Bernardo A. Huberman and Natalie S. Glance: Beliefs and Co-Operation 12: Paul M. Churchland: The Neutral Representation of the Social World Morality 13: David Schmidtz 14: Duncan MacIntosh: Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality 15: William J. Talbott: Why We Need a Moral Equilibrium Theory 16: Chantale LaCasse and Don Ross: Moralty's Last Chance Evolution 17: Brian Skyrms: Mutual Aid: Darwin Meets The Logic of Decision 18: Elliott Sober: Three Differences between Deliberation and Evolution 19: Peter A. Danielson: Evolutionary Models of Co-Operative Mechanisms: Artificial Morality and Genetic Programming 20: Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo, Andrea Bassanini and Marco Valente: Norms as Emergent Properties of Adaptive Learning: The Case of Economic Routines