| The subject introduced under three heads: expression of intention for the future, intentional action, and intention in acting | |
| Intuitive understanding of the difference between 'prediction' and 'expression of intention' rejected as a foundation for a philosophical account of expressions of intention | |
| Prediction defined so as to comprise orders and expressions of intention as well as estimates of the future | |
| The falsity of expressions of intention in the simple future tense (a) as lying and (b) as falsity because the intention is not carried out | |
| Usefulness of considering the verbal expression of intention for the future in order to avoid various dead ends | |
| Uselessness of an introspective explanation of intention | |
| Expressions of intentions distinguished from estimates of the future by the justification, if any, given for them | |
| Are there any statements of the form 'A intends X' which can be made with fair certainty? Descriptions of a man's actions often descriptions truly substitutable for 'X ' in 'A intends X' | |
| Reasons why we suppose a man the sole authority on his own intentions | |
| Intentional actions defined as those to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application | |
| Difficulty of defining the relevant sense and danger of moving in a circle in our explanations of 'reason for acting' and 'action' | |
| 'I knocked the cup off the table because I was startled' gives an answer to a question 'Why?' about something done | |
| The question 'Why?' is refused application by the answer 'I did not know I was doing that' | |
| The same action can have many descriptions, in some of which the agent knows it and in some not | |
| The question also refused application when the action was involuntary; but this notion cannot be introduced without treating as solved the very kind of problem we are discussing | |
| Difficulties of the notion 'involuntary' | |
| 'Non-observational knowledge' introduced as e.g. the knowledge one has of some of one's own movements | |
| There is also non-observational knowledge of the causation of a movement, as when I say why I gave a start | |
| We can define one class of involuntary movements without begging any questions, as the class of movements known without observation, but where there is no room for non-observational knowledge of causality: e.g. the muscular spasm one sometimes has in dropping off to sleep | |
| In one sense of 'Why?' the answer mentions evidence; but an answer to a question 'Why?' about an action, which does not mention evidence, does not therefore necessarily give a reason for acting | |
| The cases where it was difficult to distinguish a cause from a reason turn out to be ones where there is non-observational knowledge of the causation | |
| This kind of causation labelled 'mental causality' | |
| Mental causes should be distinguished from motives of actions and objects of feelings | |
| And also from intentions with which a person acts, even though these may be expressed in the form 'I wanted...' Mental causality is not important in itself, but it is important to make these distinctions | |
| Motives have been sharply distinguished from intentions by philosophers, and described as causes | |
| Popularly motive and intention are not so distinct; but 'motive' is a wider notion than' intention' | |
| A motive is not a cause at all | |
| Among motives that are not intentions for the future we can distinguish between backward-looking motives like revenge (I killed him because he killed my brother) and motive-in-general (He did it out of friendship) | |
| Motive-in-general can also be called 'interpretative' motive | |
| What distinguishes backward-looking motives from mental causes? The notions of good and harm are involved in them | |
| In some cases the distinction between a mental cau | |
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